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CABLE OPEN ACCESS AND DIRECT
ACCESS TO INTELSAT
Kenneth Katkint
ABSTRACT
The FCC is currently resolving whether cable television com-
panies that provide high-speed Internet access to residential
consumers should be required to furnish cable transmission
capacity to unaffiliated Internet Service Providers. To resolve this
controversy, the FCC has expressed a desire "to develop an analytical
approach that is, to the extent possible, consistent across multiple
platforms." The FCC's comment reflects the specific fact that local
telephone companies which provide high-speed Internet access to
residential users through Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL) currently are
required to furnish transmission capacity to unaffiliated Internet
Service Providers. However, the same comment can also be read
more broadly, as suggesting that in a world of increasing
technological convergence and increasing intermodal competition,
a more universally consistent analytical paradigm is needed to resolve
the many analogous disputes over competitive access to proprietary
bottleneck facilities that are now arising in a broad range of
communications contexts.
The issues raised by today's dispute over "cable open access"
are substantially analogous to those raised in past disputes over
"direct access" to the INTELSAT satellite system. Those disputes
were resolved in 1999, when the FCC authorized unaffiliated com-
petitors to obtain direct access to INTELSAT, on the grounds that
such a policy would: (1) encourage the widest possible deploy-
ment of communications facilities; (2) encourage competition
among providers of communications service; and (3) benefit con-
sumers by putting downward pressure on prices and upward pres-
sure on service quality and offerings. The same claims have now
been raised by proponents of cable open access. Without excep-
tion, these claims enjoy stronger factual support with respect to
cable open access today than they enjoyed with respect to INTEL-
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SAT direct access in 1999. Accordingly, implementation of cable
open access today would be analytically consistent with the im-
plementation of direct access to INTELSAT in 1999. Conversely,
an FCC decision not to implement cable open access would be
analytically inconsistent (indeed, irreconcilable) with its decision
to impose INTELSAT direct access in 1999.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
A controversy erupted almost as soon as high-speed Internet
access became available to residential users via cable modem in
1998. Should cable system operators be required to transmit the
signals of their competitors' unaffiliated Internet Service Providers
(ISPs)?' Proponents of such a regulatory requirement refer to it as
"cable open access," and assert that it is essential to create and
maintain competition in the residential ISP market.2 Opponents, in
contrast, insist that such "forced access" would be unfair to in-
cumbent cable operators and would discourage future investment
in the continued deployment of "last mile" cable facilities that
connect residential users to the Internet.
3
See Jim Chen, The Authority To Regulate Broadband Internet Access Over Cable, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677, 677 (2001) ("The regulation of cable-based platforms for high-speed
access to the Internet has become the most controversial subject in communications law."); Cf
James B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension of Cable Open Access, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 980
(2000) (the "cable open access" issue "seems to have been placed into public debate, if not to
have been first born, upon the announcement of the AT&TITCI merger [in 1998]").2 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-To-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001); Mark A.
Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, Open Access to Cable Modems, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 3 (2000); see
also Steven A. Augustino, The Cable Open Access Debate: The Case for a Wholesale Market, 8
GEO. MASON L. REV. 653, 655 (2000) (arguing that not just ISPs, but also telecommunications
service providers, should enjoy a right of open access to residential cable transmission capac-
ity); Jerry A. Hausman, J. Gregory Sidak, & Hal J. Singer, Residential Demand For Broadband
Telecommunications and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers, 18 YALE
J. ON REG. 129, 170-71 (2001) ("To remedy the risks of conduit and content discrimination,
regulators should subject any pending mergers to an open access provision."); Marcus Maher,
Comment, Cable Internet Unbundling: Local Leadership In the Deployment of High-Speed
Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 211, 221-23 (1999). See generally In re Notice of Inquiry Concern-
ing High-Speed Access to Intemet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.R.
19287, 27 (2000) [hereinafter Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access to the Internet] (defining
"cable open access" and summarizing arguments for and against it).
3 See, e.g., Julian Epstein, A Lite Touch On Broadband: Achieving the Optimal Regula-
tory Efficiency in the Internet Broadband Market, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 37 (2001); John E.
Lopatka & William H. Page, Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Specula-
tion, and Cable Bundling, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 891 (2001); James B. Speta, Handicapping the
Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J.
ON REG. 39 (2000). The phrase "last mile" is a term of art that refers to "the communications
links and related hardware that connect the premises with the rest of a telecommunications
network, most notably between the home or small business and the set of interlinked data net-
works that make up the Internet." COMMrrrEE ON BROADBAND LAST MILE TECHNOLOGY,
COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
BROADBAND: BRINGING HOME THE BITS 5 (2002). See also id. at 45 ("The link between the
[Internet] point of presence and the customer-using either existing communications infrastruc-
ture or new facilities-is frequently referred to as the 'last mile' because it represents a bottle-
neck that constrains the benefits the consumer gets from the rest of a network, which is literally
at some distance."). In the context of residential cable modem service, the "last mile" facility is
the hybrid fiber-coaxial ("HFC") cable that delivers access to the Internet into the user's home.
In the same context, a "facilities-based provider" is a provider that uses its own proprietary "last
mile" facilities to deliver high-speed Internet access to users.
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Initially, much of the "cable open access" controversy re-
volved around the threshold question of whether existing law al-
ready required (or prohibited) such access.4 On March 15, 2002,
however, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) sub-
stantially resolved this threshold question by formally classifying
the provision of high-speed Internet access to residential users via
cable modems as an "information service," and not as a "cable ser-
vice" or a "telecommunications service." 5  By classifying cable
modem services as "information services," the FCC maximized its
own continuing discretion to adopt-or not to adopt-"cable open
access" requirements. 6  To facilitate its exercise of this discretion,
the FCC simultaneously launched a new rulemaking proceeding to
consider the merits of "whether it is necessary or appropriate at
this time to require that cable operators provide unaffiliated ISPs
with the right to access cable modem service customers directly...*7
Unlike cable operators, incumbent wireline telephone local
exchange carriers ("LECs") who provide residential high-speed
4 See e.g., Chen, supra note 1, at 704, 712 (concluding that "[SItate and local authorities
[are barred] from demanding open access," but that "the FCC may issue an open access rule for
cable broadband platforms under any of several general grants of rulemaking power."); see also
Barbara S. Esbin & Gary S. Lutzker, Poles, Holes and Cable Open Access: Where the Global
Information Superhighway Meets the Local Right-of-Way, 10 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 23
(2001) (discussing FCC's authority to impose cable open access requirements); Lawrence A.
Sullivan, Is Competition Policy Possible in High Tech Markets?: An Inquiry Into Antitrust,
Intellectual Property, and Broadband Regulation as Applied to "The New Economy," 52 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 41, 82-86 (2001) (same); Christopher E. Duffy, Note, The Statutory Classifica-
tion of Cable-Delivered Internet Service, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1251, 1262 (2000) (explaining
that definitional issues in the open access controversy remain unsettled); cf Raymond Shih Ray
Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L.
REV. 87 (2000) (concluding that mandatory open access requirements would be unconstitu-
tional).
5 See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 7
(2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Order] (holding that "cable modem service, as it is currently
offered, is properly classified as an interstate information service, not as a cable service, and [it
involves] ... no separate offering of telecommunications service."), petitions for review pending
sub nom., EarthLink, Inc. v. FCC, No. 02-1097 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 26, 2002).
6 See infra Part IV.B (discussing regulatory consequences of classification of cable mo-
dem services as "information services"). Of course, the FCC's classification of cable modem
services as "information services" cannot provide the agency with authority to implement cable
open access if open access is unconstitutional, as some have argued. Cf, e.g., Ku, supra note 4,
at 93 (asserting that mandatory open access requirements would violate the First Amendment);
Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REv. 281,
295-99 & n.64 (2000) (tentatively endorsing Ku's arguments). No court or agency has yet
addressed such constitutional arguments, which are beyond the scope of this paper..
7 Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 72. In this new rulemaking proceeding, the
Commission continued to solicit commentary concerning the Commission's legal authority to
implement "cable open access." See id. at 11 72, 79-82 (soliciting further comment on the scope
of the FCC's statutory authority to implement direct access and on possible constitutional
limitations on the FCC's authority to implement direct access). The Commission also made
clear, however, that it is now ready to consider the substantive merits of implementing such a
policy. See id. at 73 (setting forth substantive considerations which the FCC seeks comment
on).
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Internet services via "Digital Subscriber Line" ("DSL") are cur-
rently subject to "unbundling" and "interconnection" obligations
which require these LECs to transmit the signals of unaffiliated
ISPs over DSL lines. 8  Because residential high-speed cable mo-
dem service and residential high-speed DSL service can appear
fungible with one another from the consumer perspective, com-
mentators have frequently drawn analogies (or distinctions) be-
tween the two services in arguing for (or against) the adoption of
"cable open access" requirements. 9 Cognizant of such analogies,
the FCC has now resolved to decide whether cable and DSL Inter-
net access should continue to be subject to substantially dissimilar
regulatory regimes.10
When it framed this issue, the Commission stated that it will
"strive to develop an analytical approach that is, to the extent pos-
sible, consistent across multiple platforms."' 1 The Commission has
thus identified regulatory parity between cable modem and DSL ser-
vice as a desirable policy objective, albeit one that might not necessar-
ily trump other policy objectives or statutory constraints. The Com-
mission's statement may also reflect a broader desire to establish a
8 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (2000). See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text; see also
Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access to the Internet, supra note 2, at 43 (as common carriers,
most wireline LECs "must allow ISPs to purchase basic transmission services on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis. As a result, end users are typically given a choice of ISPs, which could be ac-
cessed over the telephone network. Cable operators .. .do not currently operate pursuant to
rules requiring end user ISP choice."). For a review of the historical roots of the divergence
between the regulatory paradigms now applied to DSL and cable modem service, see Rosemary C.
Harold, Cable Open Access: Exorcising the Ghosts of "Legacy" Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REV.
721 (2001).
9 See e.g., Comments of SBC Corp. and BellSouth Corp. filed in In re Notice of Inquiry
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GEN Docket
No. 00-185 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) available at http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/ (arguing that because
cable modems and DSL lines provide fungible high-speed Internet access services to residential
users, the two technologies should be subject to the same regulatory requirements); cf. Speta,
supra note 3, at 42 ("On one end of the spectrum, incumbent local telephone companies are
currently subject not only to a significant remnant of traditional public utility regulation, but
also the new interconnection, unbundling, and cooperation duties imposed by the 1996 [Tele-
communications] Act .... At the other end, access providers that do not use any of the existing
telephone plant (such as ... cable television companies ... ) may not be required even to inter-
connect their facilities with those of other networks.").
10 See Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 6 ("[lin this proceeding, as well as in a
related proceeding concerning broadband access to the Internet over domestic wireline facilities,
we seek to create a rational framework for the regulation of competing services that are pro-
vided via different technologies and network architectures. We recognize that residential high-
speed access to the Internet is evolving over multiple electronic platforms, including wireline,
cable, terrestrial wireless and satellite.") (footnote omitted). The "related proceeding" referred to
in the Cable Modem Order & NPRM proposes to classify high-speed residential DSL service as
an "information service" subject to regulatory requirements substantially similar to cable mo-
dem service. See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over
Wireline Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019 (2002), [hereinafter
Wireline Broadband NPRM] reprinted in 67 Fed. Reg. 9232 (Feb. 28, 2002).
1 Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at [ 73.
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more consistent analytical approach to resolving the disputes over
competitive access to proprietary bottleneck facilities, which recur in a
broad range of communications contexts. If so, then the FCC may wish
to consider harmonizing its analytical approach to the "cable open ac-
cess" debate not only with its analytical approach to DSL access re-
quirements, but also with the approach that it recently employed to re-
solve another longstanding dispute that also concerned competi-
tors' demands for a right of unbundled access to separate compo-
nents of proprietary communications facilities.
Specifically, in 1999, the FCC adopted a rule entitling unaf-
filiated international telecommunications carriers and users to ob-
tain "direct access" at wholesale rates to the raw satellite transmis-
sion capacity of the INTELSAT satellite system, without being
required to purchase any additional "bundled" communications
services from INTELSAT's U.S. affiliate, COMSAT. 12 In author-
izing "direct access" to INTELSAT, the FCC confronted and re-
solved several issues of law and policy that are analytically analo-
gous to those raised by the current "cable open access" dispute.
The Commission's decision to implement direct access to INTEL-
SAT was predicated on its findings that adopting such a rule
would: (1) encourage the widest possible deployment of commu-
nications facilities; (2) encourage competition among providers of
communications service; (3) maintain regulatory neutrality among
competing technologies that provide similar services; and (4) re-
move regulation where the public interest is served by that ac-
tion.13 These are substantially the same policy benefits that propo-
nents claim would flow from a rule requiring "cable open ac-
cess." 1 4 Accordingly, this Paper contends that the FCC's stated goal
12 See In re Direct Access to the INTELSAT System, Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R.
15703 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 Direct Access Order]. INTELSAT is "a 143-member intergov-
ernmental organization created by international agreement." In re Applications of INTELSAT
L.L.C., Memorandum Opinion Order and Authorization, 15 F.C.C.R. 15460, 9[ 5 (2000) recon.
denied, 15 F.C.C.R. 28234 (2000) (citing Agreement Relating to the International Telecommu-
nications Satellite Organization "INTELSAT," done Feb. 12, 1973, 23 U.S.T. 3813 [hereinafter
INTELSAT Agreement] and Operating Agreement Relating to the International Telecommuni-
cations Satellite Organization, "INTELSAT," done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 4091 [hereinafter
INTELSAT Operating Agreement]). Until 2001, the INTELSAT treaty organization owned and
operated a global fleet of geostationary commercial communications satellites over which much
of the world's international telephone, video, data, Internet, and other communications were
transmitted. Id. at q 5-7. On July 18, 2001, INTELSAT's business operations were privatized
"into a corporate holding company structure." In re INTELSAT L.L.C., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 18185, 1 (2001). Today, INTELSAT's former satellite fleet is oper-
ated by Intelsat L.L.C., a Delaware corporation that "is a subsidiary within that privatized struc-
ture and the U.S. licensee for operation of existing and planned satellites in the C-band and Ku-
band." Id. For more on INTELSAT, see infra Parts 1.B, 1.B, and IV.A.
" See infra Part V.
14 See id.
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of harmonization of analytical approach militates in favor of
implementing "cable open access" or, alternatively, possibly
repealing the rule requiring direct access to INTELSAT.15
Part I of this Article describes the parallel development in the
1960s of cable television and international satellite telecommuni-
cations, each under conditions of regulated "natural monopoly."
Part II describes the onset in the 1980s of competition against the
incumbents in both industries and the regulatory readjustments that
fostered or accommodated such competition. Part III describes the
rise of residential Internet access and the separate regulatory
frameworks that characterize the low-speed and high-speed resi-
dential ISP markets. Part IV recounts the issues raised in the
separate debates over "cable open access" and "INTELSAT direct
access." On an issue-by-issue basis, Part V compares the merits of
"cable open access" with those of "INTELSAT direct access."
This Article concludes that without exception the criteria underly-
ing the FCC's decision to implement direct access to INTELSAT
in 1999 provide at least as strong a basis for implementing cable
open access today. Accordingly, implementation of cable open
access would be analytically consistent with the Commission's
stated reasons for implementing direct access to INTELSAT.
Conversely, an FCC decision not to implement cable open access
would be analytically inconsistent (indeed, irreconcilable) with the
INTELSAT direct access decision.
I. CABLE TV AND INTELSAT SATELLITES: THE MONOPOLY
YEARS
In the 1960s, America witnessed the rise of two new means of
communicating information: cable television and geostationary
international telecommunications satellites ("GEOs" or "satel-
lites"). 16 In certain respects, the business and legal arrangements
15 At first glance, the FCC might appear presently to lack authority to repeal its rule re-
quiring direct access to INTELSAT. In 1999, the FCC implemented direct access to INTEL-
SAT in a rulemaking proceeding. 1999 Direct Access Order, supra note 12. Six months later,
Congress in the ORBIT Act of 2000 codified the FCC's direct access rule, seemingly immuniz-
ing the rule against FCC repeal. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 765(a) (2001) (enacted Mar. 17, 2000). In
July 2001, however, as discussed supra note 12, INTELSAT's satellites were transferred to
Intelsat L.L.C., a Delaware corporation defined in the ORBIT Act as a "successor entity."
Compare 47 U.S.C. § 769(a)(1) (2000) (defining "INTELSAT") with 47 U.S.C. § 769(a)(7)
(2000) (defining "successor entity"). Because the statutory "direct access" requirement set forth
at 47 U.S.C. § 765(a) applies only to the intergovernmental treaty organization "INTELSAT"'
and not to any private "successor entit[ies]," the ORBIT statute no longer prohibits the FCC
from repealing its direct access rule.
16 For a collection of essays on the history of cable television in the United States, see
MILESTONES: A 50-YEAR CHRONICLE OF CABLE TELEVISION (Priscilla B. Walker & Matt
Stump eds., 3d ed. 1998). For a history of international telecommunications satellites, see
20021
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that developed around these new communications technologies
were (and remain) quite different from one another. Cable televi-
sion system operators, for example, directly serve the residential
retail consumers who are cable's end users. International GEOs,
in contrast, do not serve retail consumers directly, but instead pro-
vide transmission capacity to the U.S. telecommunications carriers
and other users (such as television networks and ISPs) who use
that capacity to provide international telephony, data transmission,
or video services to the public. Moreover, although subject to lim-
ited federal regulation, 17 cable television has always been regu-
lated primarily by the state and local authorities that issue and re-
new cable franchises.' 8 GEOs, in contrast, are located 22,300
miles above the equator-beyond the regulatory reach of any U.S.
state or local authority. Accordingly, GEOs are regulated in some
respects by the federal government' 9 and in other respects by in-
ternational treaty organizations such as the International Tele-
communications Union (ITU), an agency of the United Nations.2°
In significant respects, however, the economics of cable tele-
vision resembles that of international satellite communications.
Both industries-like local telephony-operate under conditions
where the fixed cost of entry (constructing facilities) is unusually
high in comparison with the low marginal cost of providing addi-
tional service once a facility has been built.2' Because of the eco-
CHARLES H. KENNEDY & M. VERONICA PASTOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 50-97 (1996).
17 See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-561 (2000) (setting forth federal laws governing cable
television service).
'8 See, e.g., Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370,
1377-78 (10th Cir. 1981) (footnotes and citations omitted):
[A] cable operator must lay the means of his medium underground or
string it across poles in order to deliver his message. Obviously, this
manner of using the public domain entails significant disruption, espe-
cially to streets, alleys, and other public ways. Some form of permission
from the [local] government must, by necessity, precede such disruptive
use of the public domain. We do not see how it could be otherwise. A
city needs control over the number of times its citizens must bear the in-
convenience of having its streets dug up and the best times for it to oc-
cur.
19 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-769 (2000) (setting forth federal statutes applicable to inter-
national telecommunications satellites that serve the United States); 47 C.F.R. pt. 25 (2001)
(setting forth FCC regulations applicable to such satellites).
20 See KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 16, at 52-58.
21 See, e.g., Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th
Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.):
The cost of the cable grid appears to be the biggest cost of a cable
television system and to be largely invariant to the number of subscribers
the system has.... [O]nce the grid is in place-once every major street
has a cable running above or below it that can be hooked up to the indi-
vidual residences along the street-the cost of adding another subscriber
probably is small. If so, the average cost of cable television would be
[Vol. 53:77
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nomic disincentive to subsequent entry that normally obtains under
such conditions, both the international satellite telecommunica-
tions industry and the cable television industry were long believed
to be "natural monopolies. 2  This economic theory of "natural
monopoly" was reflected in the regulatory regimes that evolved
around the two industries: in both cases, monopolies were origi-
nally protected, while rates were regulated.
A. The Development of Cable Television as a "Natural Monopoly"
Historically, local government regulation of cable television
systems "has been premised upon cable companies' need to use
public streets and rights of way to lay or string their cable. 23
Specifically, local governments have analogized the "sheer limit
on the number of cables that can be strung on existing telephone
poles" to the "spectrum scarcity" that has served as a justification
for otherwise anomalous federal regulation of the use of the broad-
cast spectrum. 24 To forestall the negative externalities that might
result if too many cables were laid, local governments have com-
monly restricted entry into the local cable television market to
those entities awarded licenses by local cable franchising authori-
ties.25
bly is small. If so, the average cost of cable television would be mini-
mized by having a single company in any given geographical area; for if
there is more than one company and therefore more than one grid, the
cost of each grid will be spread over a smaller number of subscribers,
and the average cost per subscriber, and hence price, will be higher.
See also infra Part I.B (discussing the reasons why Congress in the early 1960s believed that an
international satellite telecommunications system would constitute a natural monopoly).
22 See, e.g., Omega Satellite Products Co., 694 F.2d at 126 (presenting economic argu-
ment for why cable television service has been thought to be a "natural monopoly"); In re Regu-
latory Policies and International Telecommunications, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemak-
ing, 2 F.C.C.R. 1022, 18 (1987) (surveying reasons why international telecommunications
service was historically thought to be a "natural monopoly"), modified in other respects, 4
F.C.C.R. 7387 (1988), and modified on further recon. in other respects, 7 F.C.C.R. 1715 (1992).
In economic theory, a "natural monopoly" is defined as a firm that "can exist with decreasing
returns if any specified required rate of output can be supplied most economically by a single
firm or single system." Thomas Hazlett, The Curious Evolution of Natural Monopoly Theory, in
UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES 1, 15 (Robert W. Poole, Jr. ed. 1985). Accord WILLIAM W.
SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 4 (1982); see also MCGRAW-HILL DICTION-
ARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 394 (2d ed. 1973) (defining "natural monopoly" as "a natural
condition that makes the optimum size of the firm so large in relation to the market that there is
room for only one firm").
23 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1374 (10th Cir.
1981).
24 Id. at 1378; cf Red Lion Broadcasing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1968) (holding that
but for "spectrum scarcity," the existing system of broadcast licensing under the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 might violate the First Amendment).
25 Community Communications Co., 660 F.2d. at 1374 (citing James A. Albert, The Fed-
eral and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 501,508-13 (1977)).
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Local governments also have advanced a second basis for
government regulation of cable entry. Under the hybrid doctrine
of "medium scarcity," local government regulators have asserted
"that there are physical and economic limitations on the number of
cable systems that can practicably operate in a given geographic
area."26 That is, even when the "sheer [physical] limit on the number
of cables that can be strung on existing telephone poles" is not a
problem, some local governments have asserted "that cable broad-
casting is a monopolistic industry because it is not economically
viable for more than one cable company to operate in any given
geographic area.",27 Proponents of "medium scarcity" theory have
contended that cable's combination of physical and economic limi-
tations give the industry "the character of a natural monopoly and
thus make the cable broadcasting medium 'scarce' in much the
same way that the finiteness of the electromagnetic spectrum
makes wireless broadcasting a medium of essentially limited ac-
cess.
' 28
The theory of "medium scarcity" convinced many local gov-
ernments that it would be contrary to the public interest to permit
competing cable systems to "overbuild'" 9 one another. Judge
Richard Posner endorsed this view as follows:
You can start with a competitive free-for-all--different cable
television systems frantically building out their grids and
signing up subscribers in an effort to bring down their aver-
age costs faster than their rivals-but eventually there will be
only a single company, because until a company serves the
whole market it will have an incentive to keep expanding in
order to lower its average costs. In the interim there may be
wasteful duplication of facilities. This duplication may lead
not only to higher prices to cable television subscribers, at
least in the short run, but also to higher costs to other users of
the public ways, who must compete with the cable television
companies for access to them. An alternative procedure is to
pick the most efficient competitor at the outset, give him a
26 Id. at 1378 (emphasis added).
27 id.
2' Id. See also Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126
(9th Cir. 1982) (cable television's unique characteristics may constitute "what economists call a
'natural monopoly,' wherein the benefits, and indeed the very possibility, of competition are
limited.").
29 Cable "overbuilding" is defined as occurring "when two or more wireline cable systems
directly compete for subscribers in a local delivery market." In re Concerning Advanced Tele-
communications NOI Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, Notice
of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.R. 16641, 45 n.66 (2000) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Advanced Tele-
communications NOl].
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monopoly, and extract from him in exchange a commitment
to provide reasonable service at reasonable rates.3°
For these or similar reasons, many local governments from the
1960s through the 1980s sought to award, and protect, a monopoly
franchise in cable service in their communities.
B. The Development of the INTELSAT Satellite System as a "Natural
Monopoly"
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy called upon the United
States to spearhead an international effort to develop and operate
the world's first global satellite communications system.31 Presi-
dent Kennedy proposed that the satellite system provide global
coverage, with nondiscriminatory access, at the earliest practicable
date.32
Beginning in 1961 and through the summer of 1962, Congress
debated how best to achieve President Kennedy's ambitious goal.33
Some legislators proposed that the U.S. government should build,
finance, and operate the proposed satellite system. 34  Others fa-
vored allowing a consortium of existing U.S. telephone and tele-
graph companies to do the job.35 In contrast, the Kennedy admini-
stration proposed to charter a new, private corporation to build and
operate the U.S. portion of the proposed international system. 36
One key objective underlying the Administration's proposal
to charter a new private corporation was to facilitate investment of
private shareholder capital to finance the U.S. portion of the pro-
posed global satellite system. The creation of a new private corpo-
ration ensured that neither the taxpayers generally, 37 nor the rate-
30 Omega Satellite Products Co., 694 F.2d at 126.
31 See STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT ON COMMUNICATION SATELLITE POLICY (July 24,
1961), appended to S. REP. No. 87-1584, at 25 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2269,
2287.
32 Id. See also G.A. Res. 1721(XVI), U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 7, U.N.
Doc. A/5100 (1961) (expressing the belief of the United Nations that "communication by means
of satellites should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and
non-discriminatory basis").
33 See KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 16, at 65 (summarizing Congressional debate).
34 See, e.g., S. 2890, 87th Cong. (1962).
35 See, e.g., S. 2650, 87th Cong. (1962) (proposing carrier joint venture).
36 See, e.g., Communications Satellite Legislation: Hearings on S. 2650 and S. 2814 Be-
fore the Comm. on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 87th Cong. 388 (1962) (testimony of
Assistant Attorney Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach) (articulating the Administration's preference
"that there would be one corporation engaged in the transmission of messages by satellite, per-
forming services for all authorized communications carriers in this country ... ").
37 See 108 CONG. REC. S16,694 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1962) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)
(supporting the bill primarily because "the cost of this communications satellite system will be
privately financed rather than have it come out of the Federal budget.... What we are attempt-
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paying customers of the incumbent telephone and telegraph carri-
ers, would be compelled to bear the risk that the satellite system
would not succeed. Instead, only those persons who voluntarily
chose to invest in the new corporation would incur the risk and
enjoy the potential reward associated with the corporation's obli-
gation to "plan, initiate, construct ...and operate" the satellite
system. 38  Moreover, ownership of the new corporation would be
structured "in a manner to encourage the widest distribution to the
American public."
39
Congress in 1962 believed that private investment in the new
corporation would entail unusually high risk.40  The legislators
recognized that "in a large measure the investors who would invest
in [the] corporation will rely on the action of the Congress today to
see to it that [the] corporation has a means to .. .make adequate
earnings to justify their investment and their confidence in [the]
corporation.",41 To ensure investors an adequate return if the satel-
lite system proved successful, President Kennedy and his Congres-
sional supporters favored granting the new corporation an exclu-
sive right to furnish the channels of communication of the system
to carriers and users located in the United States.42
Another key objective of the Kennedy administration's pro-
posal was to interpose the new corporation as a counterweight to
AT&T, which was then a monopoly carrier that had already made
substantial investments in transoceanic submarine cable, as well as
nascent investments in satellite technology. The Administration
ing to do is to adapt the resources of the country and to bring in the capital through other means
than taxation.").
38 47 U.S.C. § 735(a)(1) (2000).
'9 47 U.S.C. § 734(a) (2000).
40 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 87-1584, at 11 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2269,
2273 ("it should be recognized that purchase of [the new corporation's] stock will be specula-
tive"); 108 CONG. REC. H7502 (daily ed. May 2, 1962) (statement of Rep. Harris) ("it is most
important that the membership of the House and the investing public be completely aware of
[the] unusual circumstances which render investments in this new corporation highly specula-
tive").
41 108 CONG. REC. H7525 (daily ed. May 2, 1962) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
42 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 87-1584, at 28 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2269,
2289 (statement of President Kennedy) (characterizing COMSAT as "by nature a Government-
created monopoly .. "); Communications Satellite Act of 1962, S. REP. No. 87-1319, at 2
(1962) ("The President indicated in his statement accompanying the proposal that such a corpo-
ration was by nature a Government-created monopoly .. "); see also 108 CONG. REC. H7505
(daily ed. May 2, 1962) (statement of Rep. Cellar) (noting that in the Satellite Act, "we are
creating here a private monopoly."). See generally In re COMSAT Study-Implementation of
Section 505 of the International Maritime Satellite Telecommunications Act, 77 F.C.C. 2d 564,
54 (1980) [hereinafter COMSAT Study] (the Satellite Act "creates a single entity in the form of
a private corporation to carry out its objectives and purposes ... [and] endows [COMSAT] with
extraordinary powers and privileges to carry out its mission, including monopoly status in the
provision of services via the satellite system to authorized U.S. users."). Accord id. at 591.
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sought to prevent AT&T from using its substantial market power
to dominate any consortium of existing carriers, and thereby pos-
sibly thwarting the new satellite system's development or driving
weaker rivals from the field.43 The Administration's desire to
counterbalance AT&T's dominance was given additional effect by
structural safeguards designed "[t]o prevent any single interest or
group of interests from dominating the activities of the [proposed
new] corporation .... ."44
The Administration's proposal to create a new private mo-
nopoly was not without its critics, in Congress and elsewhere.
Congressional critics of the proposal complained that U.S. com-
munications carriers carrying international traffic-and foreign
carriers carrying U.S.-bound traffic-should not be required to
"deal[] with a third party-the satellite corporation," in order to
access the facilities of the satellite system.45  Nonetheless, after
extensive debate, Congress enacted the essence of the Kennedy
administration's proposal as the Communications Satellite Act of
1962 ("Satellite Act").46
The opening provision of the Satellite Act provided that
"United States participation in the global system shall be in the
form of a private corporation. 47 That corporation was to operate
"for profit." 48 The Act authorized the corporation (COMSAT) to
"own" and "operate" the U.S. portion of the proposed global satel-
lite system and to "furnish, for hire, channels of communication"
to U.S. carriers and other U.S. users of that system.4 9 The Act also
43 See, e.g., Communications Satellites: Hearings on HR. 10115 and H.R. 10138 Before
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 563
(1962) (statement of Att'y Gen. Robert F. Kennedy) (contending that an AT&T-led carrier
consortium would "not have the same interest in promoting and guaranteeing nondiscriminatory
use and equitable access to the system by competitors as would an independent corporation");
see also DELBERT D. SMITH, COMMUNICATION VIA SATELLITE 74 (1976) ("Concern over the
possibility of an AT&T monopoly was one factor that prompted [Congress to] reorient[] ... the
direction that commercialization seemed to be following.").
44 S. REP. No. 87-1584, at 11 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2269, 2272.
45 108 CONG. REC. H7701 (daily ed. May 3, 1962) (statement of Rep. Hemphill). See
also S. REP. No. 87-1584, at 51 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2269, 2309 (minority
views) (opposing proposal to "create a private corporation that would own and operate the U.S.
portion of a worldwide satellite communications system" on ground that "[t]his corporation
would be a Government-created monopoly."); see also, e.g., 108 CONG. REC. H7515 (daily ed.
May 2, 1962) (statement of Rep. Kowalski) ("Let us make no mistake about the bill before us-
it proposes to place in private hands a Government-created private monopoly .... ).
46 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 425, codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-769 (2000) [hereinafter Satellite Act].
4' 47 U.S.C. § 701(c). The corporation that was formed pursuant to the Act was named
"Communications Satellite Corporation," or "COMSAT." Later, the corporation formally
changed its named to the Comsat Corporation.
4' 47U.S.C.§ 731.
4' 47 U.S.C. § 735(a)(1)-(2).
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directed the FCC to insure that all of COMSAT's authorized car-
rier-customers have "nondiscriminatory use of' and "equitable ac-
cess to" the system under just and reasonable rates, terms, and
conditions.5°
Consistent with the Kennedy proposal, a "basic tenet of the
Satellite Act . . . [was that at] least insofar as international com-
mon carrier communications services are concerned, Comsat is
given a virtual statutory monopoly position with respect to the op-
eration of the space segment of the commercial communications
satellite system.",5' Indeed, the FCC characterized "the general
concept pervading the Satellite Act" as being the establishment of:
Comsat as a monopoly (insofar as the space segment of in-
ternational communications is concerned) and as primarily a
carrier's carrier, created to provide at least the space segment
of international communications as part of an improved
global communications network consisting of all means of
providing such communications services, so that lower rates
should be possible to all the using public. 52
After incorporating as a District of Columbia corporation in
1963, COMSAT immediately sought foreign partners with whom
to establish the proposed satellite system. In June 1964, COMSAT
conducted a public offering of common stock, at which it raised
200 million dollars in capitalization to finance construction of the
system. 53 In 1965, an ad hoc partnership led by COMSAT, and
involving 44 nations, successfully launched into geostationary or-
bit the world's first commercial communications satellite, "Early
Bird., 54 In 1971, after several more satellites had been launched
by COMSAT-led ad hoc international partnerships,55 85 nations
formed the permanent intergovernmental satellite organization,
INTELSAT, "to continue and carry forward on a definitive basis
the design, development, construction, establishment, operation
and maintenance of the space segment of the global commercial
'0 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(2).
51 Authorized Entities & Authorized Users Under the Communications Satellite Act of
1962, 4 F.C.C.2d 421, 20 (1966) ("Authorized User F') (emphasis added), overruled by, Modi-
fication of Authorized User Policy, 90 F.C.C.2d 1394 (1982) ("Authorized User IF'), aff'd and
remanded, rTr World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 725 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.1984).
52 Id. at 24. See also KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 16, at 74 (The Satellite Act "cre-
ated COMSAT as a corporation whose sole purpose [was] to act as the intermediary between
INTELSAT and the U.S. international carrers, and gave it a perennial monopoly.") (emphasis
added).
53 See Communications Satellite Corp. v. FCC, 611 F.2d 883, 885-86 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(discussing details of this public offering).
" See Communications Satellite Corp., 5 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 369, 371 (1965).
55 See COMSAT Study, supra note 42, at 62-65 (describing interim arrangements).
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telecommunications satellite system.... ,,56 By virtue of its statu-
tory role under the 1962 Satellite Act, COMSAT was designated as
"the U.S. signatory to the operating agreement of Intelsat. ' 57
In 1978, COMSAT was also designated as the U.S. Signatory
to the International Maritime Satellite Organization "Inmarsat," a
second international treaty organization modeled on INTELSAT,
which was chartered in order to develop and operate a global mari-
time satellite telecommunications system whose facilities would
serve the maritime commercial and safety needs of the United
States and foreign countries.58 As with INTELSAT, COMSAT
was to enjoy an exclusive franchise in furnishing the satellite space
segment capacity of the Inmarsat system for communications be-
tween ships on the ocean and the United States.59
C. The Regulatory Responses To "Natural Monopoly" in the
International Satellite Telecommunications and Cable Television
Industries
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, both the international satel-
lite telecommunications industry and the local cable television in-
56 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, at Art. 11(a), 23 U.S.T. at 3813. See also id. at
23 U.S.T. at 4066-83 (listing the 85 nations that founded INTELSAT). By 2000, just before
INTELSAT was privatized, the number of member nations that had become Signatories to the
INTELSAT Agreement had risen to 144. See United States Department of State, Treaties In
Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force as of
January 1, 2000 457-58 (2000), available at http:llwww.state.gov/www/globallegaLaffairs/.
tif_01e.pdf. (listing INTELSAT member nations).
'7 S. REP. No. 95-1036, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5272, 5275. See
also Senate Report on International Maritime Satellite Telecommunications Act, S. REP. No.
95-1036, at 15 (1978), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5286 ("COMSAT was created by the Communica-
tions Act of 1962 to foster the establishment of a global satellite system and represent the
United States in the operation aspects of that system. Comsat is therefore the U.S. signatory to
the operating agreement of Intelsat."). As U.S. "Signatory" to INTELSAT, COMSAT signed
the INTELSAT Operating Agreement on behalf of the United States, and it represents the
United States within INTELSAT. See INTELSAT Agreement supra note 12, at Art. 1(g), 23
U.S.T. at 3816 (defining "Signatory"); see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 721(a), 735(a), 742 (2000); IN-
TELSAT Operating Agreement, supra note 12, at Art. 11, 23 U.S.T. at 4091 [hereinafter IN-
TELSAT Operating Agreement] (setting forth rights and obligations of Signatories).
58 See International Maritime Satellite Telecommunications Act § 503(a)(1), Pub. L. No.
95-564, 92 Stat. 2392 (1978), codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 752(a)(1)) (1994) (repealed
2000) (designating COMSAT "as the sole operating entity of the United States for participation
in INMARSAT, for the purpose of providing international maritime satellite telecommunica-
tions services").
59 See COMSAT Study, supra note 42, at 86 (1980) (footnote and citation omitted):
INMARSAT will not involve a competitive marketplace environment.
Comsat is the sole U.S. provider of space segment capacity obtained
from INMARSAT; it will interconnect on a participating carrier basis
with authorized U.S. domestic or international carriers for the extension
of maritime satellite services with the United States and beyond.
Comsat will receive and assemble all traffic for appropriate routing, ei-
ther inbound or outbound.
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dustry were considered by regulators to be "natural monopolies." 6
For this reason, substantially similar regulatory principles were
brought to bear on these two seemingly unrelated industries.
For example, as "natural monopolies," both the incumbent lo-
cal cable TV system operators and COMSAT were shielded by law
against intramodal competition, which was thought to be "waste-
ful." Until the mid-1980s, incumbent cable operators generally
were shielded by local franchising authorities against the devel-
opment of competing "overbuilt" cable systems in the same local
market. 61  Analogously, during the same period, COMSAT was
shielded by the FCC against the development of separate geosta-
tionary satellite systems capable of competing against INTELSAT
to provide U.S.-international communications services.62
Conversely, neither incumbent local cable operators nor
COMSAT ever were shielded by law against intermodal competi-
tion. Cable TV, of course, always faced at least some competition
from free over-the-air broadcast TV.63 Moreover, no law shielded
cable against the competition that eventually arose from other
"multichannel video programming distributors" ("MVPDs"), such
60 See supra Part I.A (cable); supra Part LB (international satellite telecommunications).
61 See, e.g., Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711,
713-18 (8th Cir. 1986); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1563 (5th
Cir. 1984); Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir.
1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378-80 (10th Cir.
1981); Lamb Enters. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 1972); accord Kent D.
Wakeford, Note, Municipal Cable Franchising: An Unwarranted Intrusion Into Competitive
Markets, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 233, 246 (1995) ("Under the assumption that cities could only
economically support one cable franchise, municipal authorities issued exclusive franchises in
the form of local monopolies."). For critical discussions of the history of municipal regulation
of cable entry, see id. at 246-71 and Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public In-
terest: An Economic Analysis of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335,
1358-59 (1986) (discussing political and economic incentives for local public authorities to use
the cable franchising process as a vehicle "to create durable monopolistic profit opportunities"
for their political supporters).
62 The Satellite Act itself did not preclude the development of separate international satel-
lite systems capable of competing against INTELSAT. See 47 U.S.C. § 701(d) (2000) ("It is not
the intent of Congress by this chapter to preclude.., the creation of additional communications
satellite systems, if required to meet unique governmental needs or if otherwise required in the
national interest."). Under the INTELSAT Agreement, however, the INTELSAT treaty organiza-
tion was vested with the right to veto any separate international satellite system that would cause
"economic harm" to INTELSAT. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, at Art. XIV(d), 23
U.S.T. at 3854. Although INTELSAT never actually exercised this veto, the initial opposition
of the United States to the development of separate systems may have delayed the development
of competing geostationary communications satellite systems for many years. KENNEDY &
PASTOR, supra note 16, at 79-80.
63 The cable industry has long argued "that it has no monopoly character because over-
the-air television ... and videodisks ... offer[ed] competing sources of video entertainment...
" ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 173 (1983). In 1983, however, a lead-
ing commentator analogized such claims to those of "a railroad owner in the nineteenth century
denying being a monopolist because anyone refused access to a train could use a horse and
buggy." Id.
[Vol. 53:77
CABLE OPEN ACCESS
as direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") and terrestrial "wireless ca-
ble" service.64 Similarly, the INTELSAT system from its incep-
tion faced intermodal competition, albeit limited, in the interna-
tional telecommunications market from terrestrial facilities such as
transoceanic submarine cables and short wave radio.65 For various
reasons, probably including both technological considerations and
the advantages of incumbency, intermodal competition made no
substantial competitive inroads against either cable TV or INTEL-
SAT until relatively recently.66 Thus, both international satellite
telecommunications and cable TV emerged as de facto monopo-
lies, freed by law from facing any intramodal competition, and by
circumstances from facing any intermodal competition.
Despite their respective monopolies, until recently neither
INTELSAT nor incumbent cable systems have been subject to the
panoply of unbundling and interconnection requirements that have
long applied to telecommunications common carriers in possession
of similar monopolies.67 This result was not inevitable. In 1970,
64 See Application of Satellite Television Corporation for Authority to Construct an Ex-
perimental Direct Broadcast Satellite System, 91 F.C.C.2d 953 (1982) (approving the first ap-
plications to provide DBS service), affd sub nom., National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740
F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also In re Private Operational-Fixed Microwave Service, Mul-
tipoint Distribution Service, Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service, Instructional Televi-
sion Fixed Service, and Cable Television Relay Service, 5 F.C.C.R. 6410 (1990) (authorizing
new "wireless cable" service analogous to DBS service, but transmitting from terrestrial broad-
cast towers rather than from satellites), corrected, 5 F.C.C.R. 6666 (1990), modified, 6 F.C.C.R.
6764 (1991), recon. granted in part, 10 F.C.C.R. 7074 (1995), and clarified on denial of recon.,
11 F.C.C.R. 17003 (1996).
0 "Undersea cables provided the first mean of transmission for voice communication
between the U.S. and foreign points. The first successful trans-Atlantic [telegraph] cable was
run between Ireland and Newfoundland in 1865 and the first undersea telephone cable between
Europe and the U.S. was TAT-i, laid in 1956." Alieen A. Pisciotta et al., Regulatory Consid-
erations Affecting Investments In Global Satellite and Undersea Cable Systems, in TELECOM
DEALS Now: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERPLAY OF REGULATORS, CORPORATE, SECURITIES, &
BANKRUPTCY ISSUES 399, 415 (Bruce R. Kraus et al. eds., 2001). As early as 1870, transoce-
anic submarine cables had been used to connect five port cities in China with Shanghai. See
Zhou He, A History of Telecommunications, in China: Development and Policy Implications, in
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 55, 57-60 (Paul S.N. Lee ed., 1997).
66 See infra Part II (discussing the onset of intermodal competition). Even today, despite
facing substantial facilities-based intermodal competition, cable continues to dominate the resi-
dential market for multichannel video programming ("MVPD market"). See In re Annual As-
sessment of Status of Competition in Market for Delivery of Video Programming, Eighth An-
nual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 1244, [ 7-8, 13 (2002) [hereinafter Eighth Video Competition Report]
(noting that as of mid-2001, almost 69 million Americans were subscribing to cable television
service, while only 19.3 million American homes were subscribing to non-cable MVPDs, most
prominently Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) service).
67 Since the beginning of the twentieth century, all telecommunications common carrers
have borne a duty to provide service to other carriers at just and nondiscriminatory rates. See,
e.g., People ex rel. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 129 N.E. 220, 222
(N.Y. 1920) (holding that no telegraph or telephone corporation shall make or give out undue or
unreasonable preference to any person, entity, or locality). This duty of physical interconnec-
tion at just and reasonable rates is reflected in the Communications Act of 1934, see 47 U.S.C.
§§ 201, 203, 205 (2000), and was expanded considerably in the Telecommunications Act of
2002]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
for example, several members of a commission on cable television
established by the Sloan Foundation concluded that cable televi-
sion systems should immediately be regulated as common carri-
ers.68 Likewise, a 1973 report by a Presidential Cabinet Commit-
tee on Cable Communications proposed an evolutionary approach:
cable operators initially would be permitted to select the program-
ming carried over their cable systems, but later would be subject to
common carrier regulation when cable penetration reached 50% of
American homes. Similarly, as discussed in Part I.B, supra,
Congress in 1962 considered alternative approaches to organizing
the proposed international satellite system that would have ren-
dered its satellites fully subject to traditional common carrier obli-
gations.7 °
In the main, however, the regulatory regimes that developed
around cable television "reflected the traditional view that the one-
way delivery of television programs, movies, and sporting events
is not a traditional common carrier activity and should not be regu-
lated as such.' '71  Accordingly, while "[T]he Commission has long
had rules that require cable operators to reserve system capacity
for programming produced by entities unaffiliated with the cable
operator,, 72 these rules have not required cable operators to inter-
1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-259 (2000). See generally CHARLES H. KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 35-36 (2d ed. 2001):
[Incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs")] own and control an
overwhelming preponderance of the switches, access lines, and other fa-
cilities through which non-ILEC service providers must reach their cus-
tomers, and the ILECs' decisions concerning when and on what terms
they will make their networks available to others can determine the ex-
tent-or indeed the very existence-of competition in a wide range of
markets. For this reason Congress, the FCC, the state PUCs, and the an-
titrust courts have intervened extensively to dictate when, to whom, and
on what terms the ILECs will offer wholesale services and facilities.
See also Howard Shelanski, Regulating at the Technological Edge: New Challenges For the
F.C.C., 2000 MICH. ST. U. L. REV. DET. C.L. 3, 4 (2000) (explaining the scope of the LEC
unbundling requirements set forth in the 1996 Act).
68 POOL, supra note 63, at 169 & 286 n.33 (citing ON THE CABLE (1971)).
69 Id. at 169 & 286 n.34 (citing Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications, Cable-
Report to the President (1974)). See also Robert A. Kreiss, Deregulation of Cable Television
and the Problem of Access Under the First Amendment, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1981) (argu-
ing that cable's monopoly status combined with its abundance of channels should give rise to an
affirmative duty to provide access to unaffiliated programmers).
70 See, e.g., S. 2650, 87th Cong. (1962) (proposing that the satellite system be constructed
by a consortium of existing U.S. telecommunications common carriers); S. 2890, 87th Cong.
(1962) (proposing that the government build, finance, and operate the proposed satellite system,
and provide nondiscriminatory access to all carriers).
71 Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 61 & n.232. This "traditional view" was codified
in the Cable Act of 1984. See 47 U.S.C. § 54 1(c) (2000) ("Any cable system shall not be subject to
regulation as a common carier or utility by reason of providing any cable service.").
72 Shelanski, supra note 67, at 7. These rules include: the "must-carry" rules, which re-
quire cable carriage of the broadcast signals of most local over-the-air broadcast channels, 47
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connect their systems with those of other cable operators. Nor
(except in the limited context of "leased access") have cable opera-
tors been required to provide any general right of channel access to
unaffiliated content providers on a nondiscriminatory basis, i.e. on
the same terms and conditions that such access is provided to af-
filiated providers.73  Analogously, until the advent of "direct ac-
cess" in 1999, 74 INTELSAT was not required to provide unbundled
("raw") satellite capacity to unaffiliated international telecommu-
nications carriers on a nondiscriminatory basis, i.e. on the same
terms and conditions that such capacity is provided to INTEL-
SAT's affiliated provider, COMSAT. Instead, INTELSAT's U.S.
affiliate COMSAT enjoyed an exclusive right to furnish INTEL-
SAT transmission capacity to carriers and users located in the
United States, where such capacity was often bundled with other
services provided by COMSAT.75
In lieu of relying on unbundling or interconnection require-
ments, regulators historically sought to control the monopoly
power of both COMSAT and cable operators primarily through
direct regulation of rates and services.76 Under the Satellite Act,
U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (2000); the "PEG" rules, which require carriage of a certain amount of non-
commercial educational programming provided by the local franchising authority or its as-
signee, 47 U.S.C. § 531 (2000); and the "leased access" rules, which reserve certain cable chan-
nels for hourly commercial lease by unaffiliated third parties, 47 U.S.C. § 532 (2000). The
"must-carry" rules survived a First Amendment challenge in Turner Broadcasting System v.
FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). The "PEG" and "leased access" rules were substantially sustained
in Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
73 In AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit
suggested in dicta that because cable modem services are not "cable services" under the Com-
munications Act, it "would lead to absurd results, inconsistent with the statutory structure" to
construe the "leased access" provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 532 as vesting unaffiliated ISPs with a
right to lease cable channel capacity in order to offer high-speed Internet service. Subsequently,
the FCC's affirmed the Ninth Circuit's view that cable modem services are not "cable services"
under the Act. Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 60. In so doing, the FCC appears to have
eliminated any lingering possibility that the cable "leased access" rules might some day serve as
a vehicle for implementing "cable open access." Cf, e.g., Comments of Consumer and ISP
Representatives, filed in Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and
Other Facilities, No. 00-185 at 3, 6-10 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) available at http://www.fcc.gov/e-
file/; Comments of Consumers Union et al, filed in Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to
the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, No. 00-185 at 22 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) available at
http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/ (arguing for implementation of "cable open access" under the cable
"leased access" rules).
74 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the INTELSAT Direct Access debate).
75 See supra text accompanying notes 47-57 (discussing COMSAT's authorization to own
and operate the U.S. portion of the global satellite system); see also, e.g., Alexandra M. Field,
Note, INTELSATat a Crossroads, 25 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 1335, 1341 (1994) (the Satellite
Act "gave COMSAT a host of powers, the most important of which was monopoly status in the
provision of the U.S. satellite links.") (emphasis added).
76 These regulatory tools were also included in the arsenal available to regulators of com-
mon carrier LECs. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203-205 (2000) (imposing rate regulation on tele-
communications common carriers); 47 U.S.C. §§ 208, 214 (2000) (imposing quality-of-service
regulation on telecommunications common carriers). Unlike international satellite or cable
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the FCC exercised direct regulatory authority over the rates
charged by COMSAT for INTELSAT transmission capacity, 77 and
over the selection and the quality of COMSAT's service offer-
78ings. Similarly, except during the late 1980s (when federal law
preempted most local rate and service regulation), local cable fran-
chising authorities sought to control the monopoly power of cable
operators by directly regulating the rates and service offerings of
cable franchisees.79 In sum, for many years, there were substantial
parallels between COMSAT and local cable operators with respect
to both the nature of their respective "natural monopolies," and the
regulatory responses thereto.
operators, however, common carrier LECs were subject to access and unbundling requirements
in addition to rate and quality-of-service regulation. See supra note 8.
" See 47 U.S.C. § 74 1(a) (2000)(deeming COMSAT subject to common carrier rate regu-
lation in its provision of INTELSAT satellite capacity and earth station services); 47 U.S.C.
§ 721(c)(2) (2000) (authorizing the FCC to regulate the "charges, classifications, practices,
regulations, and other terms and conditions and [to] regulate the manner in which available
facilities of the [satellite] system and [earth] stations are allocated among such users thereof");
In re COMSAT Corp. Reclassification as a Non-Dominant Carrier, Order and Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 14083, 8 (1998) [hereinafter COMSAT Non-Dominant Order]
(noting that COMSAT's rates are subject to common carrier regulation under the Satellite Act),
modified on recon., 14 F.C.C.R. 3065 (1999). In 1998, COMSAT was substantially reclassified
as a nondominant common carrier, and relieved from rate regulation on the large majority of its
U.S.-intemational routes. Id. at IN 2-3.
78 Id. See also 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(3)-(l1) (1994) (repealed in part 2000).
79 See HOUSE REPORT ON CABLE FRANCHISE POLICY AND COMMUNITCATIONS ACT OF
1984, H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4656 ("Cable
television has been regulated at the local government level through the franchise process. A
municipal franchise granted to a cable operator has commonly specified ... the service to be
provided, and the rate which may be charged for those services.") The 1984 Act substantially
preempted such local rate and service regulation. See Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779; see also H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 24-25 (1984), re-
printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4661-62 (asserting that some municipal franchising
authorities had imposed unrealistic service requirements without permitting franchisees to price
their services properly). In 1992, the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act substantially reinstated local government regulation of cable rates. See Pub. L. No. 102-
385, 106 Stat. 1460; see also Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (sustaining FCC rules implementing the 1992 Act). Subsequently, however, the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 returned to partial deregulation by limiting the regulatory authority
of local franchising authorities only to rates charged for "basic tier" service, and not the rates
charged for "cable programming" service (CNN, MTV, ESPN, etc.). See 47 U.S.C. § 543
(2000).
For critical discussions of the history of local regulation of retail cable TV rates, see Time
Warner Entertainment Co., 56 F.3d at 161-205. For critical discussions of the economic theory
underlying local regulation of retail cable TV rates, see Donald J. Boudreaux & Robert B. Eke-
lund, Jr., The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: The Triumph
of Private over Public Interest, 44 ALA. L. REV. 355, 362-66 (1993); Richard A. Posner, The
Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCt. 98 (1972).
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II. THE RISE OF COMPETITION IN THE CABLE TELEVISION AND
INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES
Despite the economic theory of "natural monopoly" and the
legal and regulatory regimes that were constructed in its image, it
turned out that-as with the telephone industry-putative competi-
tors did wish to enter both the cable television and international
satellite telecommunications industries, and to compete against the
entrenched incumbent "natural monopolies."8 0  Slowly, govern-
ment responded to these competitors' pleas. During the 1980s,
following the consent decree that broke up AT&T's telephone mo-
nopoly and introduced a measure of competition into long-distance
telephony, l the U.S. government reversed its prior course and
sought to permit and, indeed, encourage similar competition in the
cable and satellite industries.
A. The Introduction of Competition Against Incumbent Cable
Television System Operators
The first branch of government to act in favor of introducing
facilities-based competition to the cable television industry was the
judicial branch. In a series of cases beginning in the early 1980s,
federal courts began to conceptualize local ordinances granting
monopoly cable franchises as prior restraints against the "speech"
of putative cable competitors, potentially subject to First Amend-
ment limits.82 The Supreme Court tentatively adopted this view in
City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc.,83 in which
go See Glen 0. Robinson, The New Video Competition: Dances with Regulators, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1016, 1044 n.87 (1997) (citing Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the
Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
1335 (1986)):
Today, the idea that cable should be treated as a natural monopoly is so
unpopular not even the cable industry openly voices it. The basis for that
unpopularity partly reflects skepticism about the degree of scale econo-
mies. Even more, however, it reflects revised thinking about the policy
implications: modem policy analysts do not see that large economies of
scale necessarily foreclose the possibility or the desirability of active
competition.
Cf STUART MINOR BENJAMIN, DOUGLAS GARY LICHTMAN, & HOWARD A. SHELANSKI, TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 379 (2001) (querying "why is it that often the legal re-
sponse to natural monopoly is to restrict entry?" and whether "the entrance of a competitor into
a market mean[s] that the market is not properly characterized as a natural monopoly?").
81 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
12 See, e.g., Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330,
1336-37 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Omega Satellite Products v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127
(7th Cir. 1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1376-77
(10th Cir. 1981).
83 476 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986).
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it held that the First Amendment principle of the marketplace of
ideas prohibits a municipality with excess utility pole capacity
from awarding a monopoly cable franchise. Congress later fol-
lowed the courts' lead by providing in the 1992 Cable Act that "a
franchising authority may not grant an exclusive franchise and
may not unreasonably refuse to award an additional competitive
franchise."
84
Since the origin of intramodal cable competition in the 1980s,
deployment of competing (or "overbuilt") systems has been slow. 85
Of the 33,000 cable community units nationwide, "[a]s of year-end
1999, competing franchises [had] been awarded for service to
[only] 369 communities in 34 states. 86 As of July 2000, the FCC
had certified that overbuilt cable systems were actually operating
and providing "effective competition" to the incumbent providers
in 330 of these 369 individual communities. 87  In January 2002,
however, the FCC declined to provide an updated count of over-
built communities, while suggesting that many overbuilders "are
facing difficulties in obtaining capital ... [and therefore] have
scaled back plans, reduced capital expenditures, reduced staffs, or
shut down operations altogether., 88
8 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
385, § 7(a)(1), 106 Stat. 1460, 1483, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000).
85 Cable "overbuilding" is defined as occurring "when two or more wireline cable systems
directly compete for subscribers in a local delivery market." Advanced Telecommunications
NOI, supra note 29, at 45 n.66 (citation omitted).
86 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Seventh Annual Report, 16 F.C.C.R. 6005, 37 (2001) [hereinafter Sev-
enth Video Competition Report]. Because some of the nation's most densely populated cable
communities number among the 369 in which competitive systems have been authorized, fran-
chised cable overbuilders currently have the potential to serve more than 18.5 million of Amer-
ica's 105.5 million television homes. Id. By way of comparison, as of June 2001, 69 million
homes subscribed to cable television service provided by incumbent franchisees, and another
1.5 million subscribed to non-franchised "SMATV" service, which uses substantially the same
technology used by franchised cable TV systems, but serves apartment buildings without using
public rights-of-way. Eighth Video Competition Report, supra note 66, at IN 7, 13. Only
twenty percent of American households (i.e., about 20.7 million households) currently watch
television via free, over-the-air terrestrial broadcast signals. Id. at 79.
87 Seventh Video Competition Report, supra note 86, at 37. See also 47 U.S.C.
§ 543(l)(1) (2000) (defining four possible alternative bases for determining that an incumbent
cable TV system is now subject to "effective competition," and hence relieved from rate regula-
tion).
88 Eighth Video Competition Report, supra note 66, at 108. The Commission in the
Eighth Video Competition Report announced that "[o]f the 33,000 cable community units na-
tionwide, 419, or approximately one percent have been certified by the Commission as having
effective competition as a result of consumers having a choice of more than one MVPD." Id. at
120. This new figure of 419, however, includes not just communities that have been overbuilt
by a competing wireline system, but also those in which DBS satellite has gained a market share
sufficient to provide effective intermodal competition to the incumbent cable operator. See 47
U.S.C. § 543(l)(1) (setting forth several alternative bases for determining that an incumbent
cable operator is subject to "effective competition").
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On the other hand, cable television since the 1980s has faced
increasing intermodal competition from other, newer, multichannel
video programming distributors ("MVPDs"), which can provide
many of the same (or substitutable) services. 89 Most prominent
among these new competing MVPDs are satellite dish providers.
90
Cable is also subject to limited (but potentially increasing) compe-
tition from "Open Video Systems" ("OVS") that can be provided
by local telephone companies ("Local Exchange Carriers" or
"LECs") or electric utility companies through modified telephone
or electrical lines. 9' Among cost-conscious consumers, cable con-
tinues to face price competition from conventional broadcast tele-
vision, from home video sales and rentals, and from terrestrial
"wireless cable," 92 each of which is potentially substitutable for
cable television service. 93  Accordingly, while the FCC recently
concluded that "[clable television still is the dominant technology
for the delivery of video programming to consumers in the MVPD
marketplace," it also noted that cable's market share continues to
decline. 94
B. The Introduction of Competition Against INTELSAT
Although Congress initially contemplated the INTELSAT sys-
tem to be a "natural monopoly" with respect to international satel-
lite telecommunications, the FCC as early as 1966 proposed to au-
thorize the construction and operation of separate, non-INTELSAT
satellite systems to provide domestic satellite service, both to aug-
89 As of June 2001, a total of 19.3 million American homes were subscribing to non-cable
multichannel video programming distributors ("MVPDs"), most prominently Direct Broadcast
Satellite (DBS) service. Eighth Video Competition Report, supra note 66, at " 7, 13.
90 Id. at 13. The FCC characterizes all residential satellite dish service collectively as
"Direct-to-Home" ("DTH") satellite service. The DTH category consists of two subcategories:
the popular "DBS" ("Direct Broadcast Satellite") service (which generally uses a twelve-inch
satellite dish), and the older but less popular "HSD" ("Home Satellite Dish") service (which
requires a much larger dish). As of June 2001, sixteen million American households were sub-
scribing to DBS service, and another 1 million to HSD. Id. Collectively, the two DTH satellite
services are capable of providing service to virtually every U.S. home that cable can serve, as
well as some homes not yet passed by cable.
91 Id. For a history of the FCC's policy transition from prohibiting to encouraging the
deployment of OVS, see Robinson, supra note 80.
92 "Wireless cable" is the popular name for "multipoint microwave distribution service"
("MMDS"), an MVPD technology that "operates by transmitting television signals [from terres-
trial transmission towers] over the microwave bands." American Scholastic TV Programming
Foundation v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1173, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1995). "Because it broadcasts on the micro-
wave band, [wireless cable] is only accessible to users equipped with specialized antennas and
converters. Since the general public lacks this equipment, wireless cable, like cable, offers a
private, multi-channel distribution network. Wireless cable, however, operates without any
cable or other physical connection between the operator and the viewer." Id.
93 Eighth Video Competition Report, supra note 66, at 1 13, 79 (2002).
94 Id. at 5.
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ment the long-haul terrestrial facilities of existing telecommunica-
tions carriers for point-to-point switched transmission services,
and also to connect off-shore distant domestic points (i.e., Alaska,
Hawaii, Puerto Rico) to the contiguous states. In so proposing,
the FCC contemplated that non-INTELSAT domestic satellites
might some day be used to provide point-to-multipoint services,
such as broadcast program transmission. 96  In 1970, the FCC in its
DOMSAT I Order adopted an "open skies" policy under which
qualified private applicants could be authorized to construct and
operate domestic satellite systems capable of competing against
both the domestic terrestrial carriers and INTELSAT in the long-
haul domestic telecommunications market. 97  The "open skies"
policy paved the way for the development of a domestic satellite
communications industry.
Even while crafting an "open skies" policy for domestic satel-
lite communications, however, the FCC's DOMSAT I and DOM-
SAT H Orders protected INTELSAT against the advent of intra-
modal competition in the market for U.S.-international satellite
telecommunications capacity. In part, the FCC's decision to pre-
serve INTELSAT's monopoly was influenced by the terms of the
INTELSAT Agreement, which permitted INTELSAT itself to veto
the development of any separate international satellite systems that
would cause "economic harm" to INTELSAT. 98  However, as in-
95 See Notice of Inquiry, 31 Fed. Reg. 3507 (Mar. 2, 1966); Supplemental Notice of In-
quiry, 31 Fed. Reg. 13763 (Oct. 20, 1966).
96 Supplemental Notice of Inquiry, 31 Fed. Reg. 13763 (Oct. 20, 1966). See also Estab-
lishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities By Non-Governmental Entities,
Second Report and Order, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, 4 (1972) [hereinafter DOMSAT IH Order], recon.
denied, 38 F.C.C.2d 665 (1972), affd sub nom. Network Project v. FCC, 511 F.2d 786 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
97 See Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-
Governmental Entities, First Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 86, 19 (1970) [hereinafter DOM-
SAT I Order]. In the subsequent DOMSAT 11 Order, the FCC authorized COMSAT, through a
separate subsidiary, to launch its own domestic satellite venture, independent of its INTELSAT
operations. See DOMSAT I1 Order, supra note 96; see also Communications Satellite Corp., 45
F.C.C.2d 288 (1974) (authorizing COMSAT's investment in a non-INTELSAT domestic satel-
lite venture), modified, 55 F.C.C.2d 565 (1975).
98 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, at Art. XIV(d), 23 U.S.T. at 3854. The "eco-
nomic harm" provision was justified as a means of protecting INTELSAT against "cream-
skimming" in order to safeguard INTELSAT's ability to serve every country on earth, regardless of
cost, on non-discriminatory terms and conditions. See KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 16, at 79-
80. By assenting to this provision, INTELSAT member nations pledged, in principle, not to
develop their own separate international satellite facilities without first obtaining INTELSAT's
guarantee that such development would "not prejudice the establishment of direct telecommuni-
cations links throughout the INTELSAT space segment among the participants in the proposed
system." Francis Lyall, Law of Satellite Communications, in SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND
SCOPE 113, 122 (Nandasiri Jasentyuliyanta ed., 1992). In practice, however, INTELSAT lacked
the ability to impose any legal penalty on member states that failed to honor its determination
that a separate system posed "economic harm" to INTELSAT. Id. See also Francis Lyall, The
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ternational telecommunications traffic expanded rapidly during the
1970s and 1980s, INTELSAT did consent to the development of
several competing "separate systems" that provided competitive
regional international service in different parts of the world."
On November 28, 1984, President Reagan "determine[d] that
separate international communications satellite systems [were] re-
quired in the national interest." 1 Accordingly, he jointly directed
both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce "to in-
form the Federal Communications Commission of criteria neces-
sary to ensure the United States meets its international obligations
[under the INTELSAT Agreement] and to further its telecommuni-
cations and foreign policy interests" by establishing separate satel-
lite systems to compete against the INTELSAT system.'0 ' On
January 31, 1985, INTELSAT responded to President Reagan's
determination by adopting a resolution urging its members not to
participate in establishing any separate international satellite sys-
tems linking the United States and Europe.10 2 Nonetheless, shortly
thereafter, the FCC first authorized the licensing of separate inter-
national satellite systems to serve U.S.-international routes. 0 3  In
International Telecommunications Union and Development, 22 J. SPACE L. 23, 29-30 (1994)
(discussing the rights and obligations of INTELSAT member states); accord Albert N. Delzeit
& Robert F. Beal, The Vulnerability of the Pacific Rim Orbital Spectrum Under International
Space Law, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 69, 80-81 (Winter 1996) (lamenting IN'TELSAT's inability to
enforce its determinations of "economic harm," and concluding that "[iun light of the lack of
INTELSATs power over its own member states .... INTELSAT is a 'paper tiger'....").
99 See KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 16, at 80 ("The first separate system to receive
approval was [Western Europe's] EUTELSAT in 1979, which was soon followed by [Southeast
Asia's] PALAPA and [the Middle East's] ARABSAT.").
10o Presidential Determination No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg. 46987 (Nov. 30, 1984). For discus-
sions of the deliberations that led to this Presidential determination, see Richard R. Colino, A
Chronicle of Policy and Procedure: The Formulation of the Reagan Administration Policy on
International Satellite Telecommunications, 13 J. SPACE L. 103 (1985); Richard R. Colino, The
Possible Introduction of Separate Satellite Systems: International Satellite Communications at
the Crossroad, 24 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 13 (1985) (discussing factors leading to President
Reagan's decision and its impact); Bert W. Rein & Carl R. Frank, The Legal Commitment of the
United States to the INTELSAT System, 14 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 219, 225-27 (1989)
(discussing the Reagan Administration and FCC's reasons for supporting separate systems).
101 Presidential Determination No. 85-2,49 Fed. Reg. 46987 (Nov. 30, 1984).
102 See Michael R. Gardner, December 19, 1984-A Big Day in Telecommunications, 34
CATH. U. L. REV. 625, 633 n.23 (1985). The resolution, which was supported by every one of
INTELSAT's 109 member nations except for the United States, asserted that that the prosperity
and political harmony of the INTELSAT satellite system would be jeopardized if separate sys-
tems were licensed by the FCC. Id.
103 See In re Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications,
101 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1985) [hereinafter Separate Systems Order], modified on recon., 61
Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 649 (1986), further recon. denied, 1 F.C.C.R. 439 (1986). Until 1996,
these separate international systems were restricted from interconnecting directly with the Pub-
lic Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). Compare id. (imposing PSTN restriction) with Per-
missible Services of U.S.-Licensed International Communications Satellite Systems Separate
from INTELSAT, 7 F.C.C.R. 2313 (1992) (sunsetting the PSTN restriction effective January 1,
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1988, the Connecticut-based Pan American Satellite Corporation
("PanAmSat") launched the PAS-1 Atlantic Ocean Region satel-
lite, the first U.S. private-sector satellite to provide international
satellite services.104 By 1999, more than 200 commercial geosyn-
chronous satellites were orbiting the earth, of which approximately
73 served the United States. 10 5 Of these, only 17 satellites be-
longed to INTELSAT, of which just 13 served the United States. °6
Accordingly, in 1998, the FCC found that INTELSAT was subject
to substantial intramodal competition on most of its U.S.-
international routes. 07
-At the same time, INTELSAT also began to face substantial
intermodal competition in the market for international communica-
tions transmission capacity. In 1988, AT&T Corp. completed the
world's first transoceanic fiber-optic cable. 08 Called TAT-8, the
cable snaked more than 3,000 miles along the Atlantic floor from
New Jersey to Great Britain.' °9 Its two fibers, running through a
cable as narrow as a man's wrist, could carry nearly 40,000 phone
conversations at once, five times the capacity of the best undersea
copper cables and comparable to all the trans-Atlantic voice traffic
then handled by satellites." 0 The first trans-Pacific fiber-optic ca-
1997). See also COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, supra note 77, at 59 (noting that the PTSN
restrictions did, in fact, sunset on January 1, 1997).
'04 See PANAMSAT, A BRIEF HISTORY OF PANAMSAT, at
http://www.panamsat.com/company/history.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2002). In 1996, PanAm-
Sat was acquired by the Hughes Electronics Corporation, which is itself 81%-owned by the
General Motors Corporation. Id. Today, Hughes/PanAmSat operates a fleet of 23 geosynchro-
nous satellites-the same number as INTELSAT. Compare PANAMSAT, THE PANAM SATEL-
LITE FLEET, at http://www.panamsat.com/global network/satellites.asp (last visited Aug. 30,
2002) (listing 23 operational satellites currently in orbit) with INTELSAT, COVERAGE MAPS, at
http:/www.intelsat.com/satellites/satellitescoveragemaps.asp (last visitied Aug. 30, 2002). On
November 12, 2001, the Luxembourg-based company SES Global surpassed both INTELSAT
and PanAmSat and obtained the world's largest fleet when it purchased 12 operational geosyn-
chronous satellites from General Electric for $4.3 billion dollars. Cynthia Boeke, Via Satellite's
Satellite Executive of the Year, in VIA SATELLITE, Mar. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL
8985450. The SES Global fleet now comprises 29 functioning satellites, with an additional 14
satellites under construction or on order. Id. See also SES AMERICOM, WELCOME TO SES
AMERICOM, at http://www.ses-americom.com/media/satellitenamesold.html (last visited
Aug. 30, 2002) (stating that SES Global has twenty-nine satellites).S105 See PHILLIPS SATELLITE INDUSTRY DIRECTORY, 17-234, 279-413 (21st ed. 1999) (set-
ting forth complete information about each of these satellites and their operators).
106 See In re Availability of INTELSAT Space Segment Capacity to Users and Service
Providers Seeking to Access INTELSAT Directly, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 19160,
2, 5 (2000) [hereinafter INTELSAT Capacity Order].
107 See COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, supra note 77, at 160 ("A number of satellite
systems are significant competitors [of INTELSAT's] for the full-time video and occasional-use
video service markets. These other satellite systems include U.S.-based systems, such as
PanAmSat and Orion, as well as [foreign-licensed] regional satellite service providers.").
108 Neil King Jr., Deep Secrets: As Technology Evolves, Spy Agency Struggles To Preserve
Its Hearing, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2001, at Al.]09 Id.
110 Id.
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ble entered service in 1991.111 During the 1990s, the entire world
witnessed a proliferation of high-capacity transoceanic submarine
fiber optic cables that are capable of delivering many of the same
services that satellites can deliver, often at lower cost. 112  In fact,
since the early 1990s, fiber-optic cable systems have carried more
traffic for U.S.-international switched voice and private line than
satellite systems have."
1 3
For these and other a14 reasons, the FCC in 1998 reclassified
COMSAT/INTELSAT as a non-dominant carrier on every major
telecommunications route to or from the United States. 115 By so
doing, the FCC found that, with respect to these routes, COMSAT
lacked "market power"-i.e., that it possessed neither "[c]ontrol of
bottleneck facilities, '1 6 nor the "ability to raise or maintain prices
Id.
112 In 1997, for example, the 17,000-mile-long "Flag Telecom" cable connected Europe
with North Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Japan. Id. See COMSAT Non-
Dominant Order, supra note 77, at 11, 19, 32-39 (characterizing satellites and submarine
cables as fungible commodities serving the markets for switched voice, private line, and video
services, and noting that cables compete effectively against INTELSAT satellites on every
major international telecommunications route to or from the United States); see also Open-
market Reorganization for the Betterment of International Telecommunications Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, United States Senate, 106th Cong. 56-59 (1999) (written testimony of INTEL-
SAT Director General Conny Kullman providing detailed information about various submarine
cable and separate satellite systems).
113 See COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, supra note 77, at 56 ("Excluding traffic carried
to Mexico and Canada over terrestrial networks, markets Comsat does not serve, fiber-optic
cable systems carried three times as much switched voice traffic and six times as much private
line traffic than satellite networks in 1996."); see also id. at 76 ("Intermodal competition leads
us to believe that fiber-optic cables represent a substitute for satellites in the transmission of
switched voice service.").
"4 The FCC also stated its expectation that INTELSAT would soon face further competi-
tion from several Low Earth Orbit satellite systems (LEOs), such as Iridium, that were then
being deployed. Id. at 19. In theory, LEOs can provide many of the same services that GEOs
can provide, with the additional benefit of mobile use. In fact, however, Iridium's spectacular
failure to attract customers resulted in the company's prompt $5 billion bankruptcy. See Nicole
Harris, Iridium to End Satellite Service, Liquidate Assets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2000, at B8.
Other LEO systems, such as the $4.3 billion GlobalStar, have followed Iridium into bankruptcy.
See, e.g., Andy Pasztor, Globalstar's Chapter 11 Filing Reflects Lack of Restructuring Plan,
Customers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2002, at B6.
115 COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, supra note 77, at 185. At the same time, the FCC
retained its classification of COMSAT as a dominant carrier on a number of minor "thin routes"
that were not served by any cable or satellite provider other than INTELSAT. These routes
primarily connected the United States with "developing nations located in Africa and Eastern
Europe as well as low density, remotely located island nations, such as Mauritius and New
Caledonia, that might not justify the cost of a cable connection." Id. at 28. See also id. at
App. A (listing IN'TELSAT's "thin routes" for each product market). In a subsequent Order, the
FCC imposed price-cap regulation on COMSAT's rates for transmission capacity over its re-
maining thin routes. In re COMSAT Corp., Policies and Rules for Alternative Incentive Based
Regulation of COMSAT Corp., 14 F.C.C.R. 3065 (1999) [hereinafter Thin Route Order].
116 COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, supra note 77, at 9.
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above costs, control prices, or exclude competition."' 1 7  This re-
classification occurred one year before the FCC was to implement
"direct access" to INTELSAT." 8 Indeed, while COMSAT's cus-
tomers and competitors urged the FCC "to permit other U.S. pro-
viders and users to obtain direct access to INTELSAT before non-
dominant relief is granted,"'' 9 the FCC rejected such demands. 120
Accordingly, the FCC clearly considered INTELSAT to be "non-
dominant" in the international telecommunications market at the
time it imposed unbundling obligations on INTELSAT. Incum-
bent cable television system operators, in contrast, continue to this
day to be "dominant" in their markets, but are not subject to analo-
gous unbundling obligations.
121
III. THE INTRODUCTION OF RESIDENTIAL HIGH-SPEED INTERNET
ACCESS
In the late 1990s, large numbers of consumers began to seek
access to the Internet directly from their homes in order to use the
World Wide Web. 122  Until 1996, most residential users could ac-
cess the Internet only by dialing up an Internet Service Provider
(ISP), such as America Online (AOL), via local telephone calls in
which digital information was translated through analog voice-
grade dial-up modems incapable of translating more than 56 kilo-
bytes per second (kbps) of information. 123  Today, dial-up ISPs
117 Id. at 66. As discussed above, these findings pertained only to COMSAT's major
U.S. international routes, and not to the "thin routes" served by no other satellite or cable service
provider. In 1999, "thin route" service accounted for less than 8% of COMSAT's INTELSAT-
based revenues. See Thin Route Order, supra note 115.
Is Direct access was finally implemented in 1999 Direct Access Order, supra note 12.
See discussion infra Subpart V.A.
119 See COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, supra note 77, at 17 & n.49.
2o See Id. at 180 ("we grant Comsat's request for reclassification as a non-dominant
common carrier with respect to its provision of INTELSAT services in the switched voice,
private line, full-time video, and occasional-use video services to competitive markets. We also
find Comsat non-dominant in the provision of earth station services"); id. at 156 ("[O]ur ac-
tion today does not require direct access to INTELSAT or a waiver by Comsat of its immu-
nity"); accord 1999 Direct Access Order, supra note 12, at 12 (noting COMSAT was reclassi-
fied as a non-dominant carrier in 1998, but that direct access was not then implemented).
121 See supra text accompanying notes 89-99 (discussing continuing dominance of cable
TV in local MVPD markets); accord Eighth Video Competition Report, supra note 66, at 5
(same); see also infra page 32 (discussing continuing dominance of cable modem service in
local residential high-speed Internet access markets); accord Cable Modem Order, supra note 5,
at 9 (same).
122 Internet use in the United States has grown at a rate of 20% a year since 1998. U.S.
Depart. of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information, A NATION ONLINE: HOW
AMERICANS ARE EXPANDING. THEIR USE OF THE INTERNET 16 (Feb. 2002), at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/anationonline2.pdf [hereinafter A NATION ONLINE]. As
of September 2001, 53.9 million U.S. households (50.5%) had Internet connections. Id. at 9.
123 Although some local exchange carriers (LECs) offered their own proprietary ISP ser-
vices, these LECs were required, as common carriers, to provide transmission services to com-
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that provide low-speed "narrowband" connections to the Internet
continue to provide the lion's share of residential Internet access
throughout the United States.
1 24
Despite the present dominance of "narrowband" ISP service
in the residential market, however, an increasing number of users
consider "narrowband" connections to be unsuitable for download-
ing the data-intensive audiovisual content and applications that
have proliferated on the World Wide Web. 125  Accordingly, new
"broadband" services offering high-speed Internet connections to
residential subscribers are rapidly gaining in popularity. 26 At the
end of 1999, only 1.8 million Americans were residential subscrib-
ers to high-speed Internet services. 127  By the end of 2000, this
number had risen to 6.8 million. 128 "[A]s of June 30, 2001, about
7.8 million households subscribed to high-speed services," which
by then were available in approximately 75-80% of all the zip
codes in the United States via DSL or cable modem service. 129 By
peting ISPs, and thereby effectively to unbundle their own proprietary ISP service from their
telephone services. See Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access to the Internet, supra note 2, at 6
(noting that for dial-up Internet access, "'last mile' transmission capability is available inde-
pendently of the choice of ISP"). Partly for this reason, the market for "narrowband" dial-up
ISP service was quite competitive nearly from its inception.
'2 As of August 2001, 80% of the nation's residential Internet users still obtained Internet
access via low-speed "dial-up" service. A NATION ONLINE, supra note 122, at 8.
12 See Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 1 10 (discussing limitations of "narrowband"
access and advantages of high-speed access).
126 See A NATION ONLINE, supra note 122, at 9 (noting that "[b]etween August 2000 and
September 2001, residential use of high-speed, broadband service doubled-from about 5 to
11% of all individuals, and from 11 to 20% of Internet users."); see also Inquiry Concerning
High Speed Access to the Internet, supra note 2, at 6-7 (describing transition from dial-up ac-
cess to high-speed access). As a matter of terminology, the FCC defines "high-speed" transmis-
sion services to include "those services and facilities with a transmission speed of 200 kbps in at
least one direction." In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunica-
tions Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, Second Report, 15
F.C.C.R. 20913, 11 (2000) [hereinafter Advanced Telecommunications Second Report]. Ser-
vices or facilities that are "capable of 200 kbps or greater transmission in both directions" are
deemed "advanced services," or are said to possess "advanced telecommunications capability."
Id.
127 Advanced Telecommunications Second Report, supra note 126, at 8(2).
128 Ernie Bergstrom, Mike Paxton, & Michelle Abraham, The Broadband Marathon: Ac-
cess Technologies Jockey for Subscribers (Cahners In-Stat Group Rep. No. MB01-04MI) (June
22, 2001), at http://www.adsl.com/latestnews/analys-corner.html.
129 Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 9 n.24 (citing In re Concerning the Advanced
Telecommunications NOI Capability to All Americans in Reasonable and Timely Fashion, Possi-
ble Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of Telecommunications Act of
1996, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 7 (2002)). Moreover, the FCC estimates that "nearly 98% of the coun-
try's population lives in the 79% of zip codes where a provider reports having at least one high-
speed service subscriber." FCC INDUSTRY ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, WIRELINE
COMPETITION BUREAU, HIGH SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DE-
CEMBER 31, 2001, at 4 (2002), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Com-
monCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/LAD/hspd07O2.pdf. [hereinafter HIGH SPEED SERVICES
STATUS REPORT] In addition, many of the 20-25% of U.S. homes that cannot obtain cable modem
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the end of 2001, 11 million high-speed lines were serving U.S.
residential and small business subscribers. 130  By the end of 2002,
industry analysts project that "total U.S. broadband subscribers
will rise ... to over 19 million."' 3' "By 2008, that number is pre-
dicted to reach 78 million.'32
At present, high-speed Internet connections are delivered to
residential users via several competing technological platforms. In
most U.S. locations, incumbent cable operators became the first
entities to deploy high-speed Internet access to residential users.
Cable operators were able to do this by upgrading their existing
hybrid fiber-coaxial (HFC) cable television facilities to offer two-
way high-speed data transmission services, with Internet access
made possible through cable modem technologies. 33  Cable mo-
dem connections are very fast, often providing downstream trans-
mission speeds of up to 1.5 megabytes per second (Mbps) to resi-
dential users. 134  Moreover, in launching high-speed Internet ser-
vice, cable operators realized substantial savings by utilizing the
same cable that had already been laid to provide cable TV ser-
vice. 
35
Unlike incumbent LECs, 36 "cable operators currently are not
legally prohibited from having an exclusive relationship with one
homes that cannot obtain cable modem or DSL service can obtain high-speed Internet access via
satellite. See infra notes 148-49.130 HIGH SPEED SERVICE STATUS REPORT, supra note 129, at 1 & tbl.3.
11 Ernie Bergstrom, Mike Paxton, and Michelle Abraham, The Broadband Marathon:
Access Technologies Jockey for Subscribers (Cahners In-Stat Group Rep. No. MB01-04MI)
(2001), at http://www.adsl.con/latestnews/analystcomer.html.
132 DEBORAH A. LATHEN, BROADBAND TODAY, FCC STAFF REPORT ON INDUSTRY MONI-
TORING SESSIONS 9 (1999), at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf
(citing John Schwartz, How Much Room in the Fat Pipe?, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1999, at
HO1)).
133 See Advanced Telecommunications Second Report, supra note 126, at 29 ("Cable
modem technologies rely on the same basic network architecture used for many years to provide
multichannel video service, but with upgrades and enhancements to support advanced ser-
vices."); see also id. at 31 (explaining the upgrades needed).
134 Id. at 33.
"3 Id. at 31 ("Once an HFC network is upgraded, new services are available to all homes
passed by the upgraded infrastructure. This contrasts with DSL technologies, where variations
in legacy outside plant conditions can limit access to certain end-users even in upgraded areas,
and with wireless technologies where line-of-sight requirements may be a factor.").
1.36 See In re Matters of Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommu-
nications Capability, 14 F.C.C.R. 20912, 4 (1999) [hereinafter Line Sharing Order] (amending
unbundling rules to require incumbent LECs to provide unbundled access to the high-frequency
portion of the local loop, in order to enable unaffiliated competitors to provide DSL service
through the incumbent LEC's telephone lines), recon. denied in pertinent part, 16 F.C.C.R.
2101 (2001), appeal pending sub nom., United States Telecom Association v. FCC, No. 00-
1012 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 18, 2000); see also Wireline BroadbandNPRM, supra note 10 (initiat-
ing proceeding to consider whether DSL unbundling requirements should be relaxed to attain
regulatory parity with cable modem service).
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particular ISP," including an affiliated or wholly-owned ISP. 13 7
Accordingly, most cable operators bundled three distinct services
into a single package collectively marketed as "cable modem ser-
vice." This package included: (1) high-speed cable transmission
of data between the user's home and the cable headend; (2) access
to the Internet through proprietary servers and routers located at
the cable headend, plus management of the use of the cable net-
work for data delivery services; and (3) browsing and e-mail func-
tionalities, some online content (usually including a search en-
gine), and user support services similar in nature to those offered
by other ISPs.' 38 In short, residential cable modem service tends to
combine transmission services and ISP services into a single bun-
dled package. 13
9
Because very few communities currently enjoy two or more
overbuilt HFC cable systems, 14° very few incumbent cable opera-
tors face intramodal competition in the provision of cable modem
service. Intermodal competition, however, arose quickly, and is
continuing to spread. As of December 2001, however, cable mo-
dems continued to serve 68% of the U.S. market for residential
high-speed Internet access.1 41 Despite rapid growth in the overall
137 Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access to the Internet, supra note 2, at 29. The FCC did,
however, recently initiate a new rulemaking proceeding to "consider whether it is necessary or
appropriate at this time to require that cable operators provide unaffiliated ISPs with the right to
access cable modem service customers directly." Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 1 72.
138 Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access to the Intemet, supra note 2, at 10. See also
Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 11 (footnote omitted):
Cable operators often include in their cable modem service offerings all
of the services typically provided by Internet access providers, so that
subscribers usually do not need to contract separately with another Inter-
net access provider to obtain discrete services or applications, such as an
e-mail account or connectivity to the Internet, including access to the
World Wide Web.
For present purposes, the FCC defines "cable modem service" as "a service that uses cable system
facilities to provide residential subscribers with high-speed Internet access, as well as many
applications or functions that can be used with high-speed Internet access." Id. at 31.
39 See National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S.
327, 352-53 n.4 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part):
Residential high-speed Internet access typically requires two separate
steps. The first is transmission from a customer's home to an Internet
service provider's (ISP's) point of presence. This service is generally
provided by a cable or phone company over wires attached to poles,
ducts, conduits, and rights of way. The second is a service delivered by
an ISP to provide the connection between its point of presence and the
Internet.
140 See supra notes 85-88.
141 Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 9. Accord A NATION ONLINE, supra note 122,
at 41. Unlike the most recent FCC reports, the Commerce Department does not count small
business users as residential users. For this reason, the Commerce Department's summary
statistics differ slightly from the FCC's.
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market, cable's market share appears at present to be holding
steady. 142
Chief among cable's intermodal competitors in the residential
high-speed Internet access market is asymmetric digital subscriber
line service ("ADSL" or "DSL"), which is capable of delivering a
1.5 Mbps download and a 786 kbps upload through reconfigured
"twisted pair" copper wires of the existing telephone system.1
43
Although DSL service has been widely deployed by LECs in U.S.
metropolitan areas, the service is subject to certain technical limi-
tations that currently prevent it from being deployed to some resi-
dences. 144 Nonetheless, DSL has already captured 29% of the U.S.
residential high-speed Internet access market.1 45  As noted above,
unlike cable modem providers, most incumbent LECs are required
by FCC Rules to unbundle their transmission services from their
ISP services.
46
In addition to cable and DSL (which collectively now control
97% of the residential high-speed Internet access market), several
other emerging technologies also can deliver high-speed Internet
data transmissions to residential users. For example, several ter-
restrial "fixed wireless" technologies currently enable two-way
digital signals to be transmitted through the wireless spectrum be-
tween a local transmitting tower and a special antenna that must be
142 From July to December 2001, the total number of high-speed Internet access lines
serving U.S. residential and small business users rose from 7.8 million to 11 million, a 41%
increase. HIGH SPEED SERVICES STATUS REPORT, supra note 129. During that same period,
however, cable's share of that combined market for high-speed access remained constant at
precisely 64%. See id. (setting forth raw data underlying author's computation). The FCC has
not released data for year-end 2001 which disaggregates residential users from small business
users.
141 See, e.g., Cincinnati Bell Zoomtown Web Page, at
http://company.zoomtown.comlresidentialpromotions.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002). Al-
though 786 kbps download/ 384 kbps upload remains the standard speed for residential DSL
service, many DSL providers (including Zoomtown) have recently developed a higher-priced
"hyperspeed" residential DSL service offering capable of delivering 105 Mbps download and
768 Kbps upload through reconfigured "twisted pair" copper wires of the existing telephone
system. Id.
144 See Advanced Telecommunications Second Report, supra note 126, at InJ 38-40 (ex-
plaining technical reasons why ADSL cannot serve many American homes).
145 Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at [ 9. The NTIA estimates DSL's share of the resi-
dential high-speed market to be 33%. A NATION ONLINE, supra note 122. This NTIA's figure of
33% corresponds with the FCC's estimation of DSL's aggregate market share in the combined
markets for residential and small business users. See HIGH SPEED SERVICES STATUS REPORT,
supra note 129, at tbl.3 (setting forth raw data underlying author's computation).
146 See Line Sharing Order, supra note 136, at 4. In practice, this unbundling require-
ment enables a user whose DSL line is provided by her local telephone company (e.g., Bell
Atlantic or BellSouth) to choose to obtain access to the Internet through proprietary servers and
routers of an unaffiliated ISP (e.g., AOL or EarthLink) without also having to pay for the use of
the telephone company's servers and routers.
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installed on the user's rooftop. 147 Like cable system operators and
unlike incumbent LECs, providers of fixed wireless services are
not required by law to unbundle their transmission services from
their ISP services.
High-speed data transmissions also can be delivered to resi-
dential users via satellite. At present, at least one geostationary
satellite system, Hughes' DirecPC, can use the satellites of its DBS
affiliate, DirecTV, to provide 400 kbps downstream transmission
to any household in the continental United States that has an unob-
scured line-of-sight to the southern sky. 148  Moreover, newly de-
veloping technologies will use low-earth-orbit satellites (LEOs) to
offer mobile, two-way communications at even higher transmis-
sion speeds than existing technologies. The most ambitious such
system, the Teledesic Network, is currently building a 288-satellite
system that promises to provide millions of simultaneous users
with downlink transmission speeds up to 64 Mbps, and uplink
speeds up to 2 Mbps. 149 Like cable system operators and terrestrial
fixed wireless service providers, but unlike incumbent LECs, satel-
lite providers are not required by law to unbundle their transmis-
sion services from their ISP services.
In sum, cable modem service emerged as the first entrant into
the market for residential high-speed Internet access, and therefore
147 See Advanced Telecommunications Second Report, supra note 126, at V 42-55 (survey-
ing various fixed wireless technologies). In Chicago, one such fixed wireless service currently
provides typical downstream transmission speeds of 512 kbps to 1.5 Mbps, with a 256 kbps
maximum upload speed. See Sprint Broadband Direct Web Page, at
http://www.sprintbroadband.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2002). That operator, however, recently
announced that it will no longer provide service to any additional new customers. See Status of
Sprint Broadband Direct at http://www.sprintbroadband.com/statusFAQ.html (last visited Sept.
5, 2002) ("The limitations of the current generation of fixed wireless technology do not allow
for an optimum cost structure. Therefore, we will not be acquiring or installing any additional
Sprint Broadband Direct customers with the current technology. We will, however, continue to
operate and maintain the existing base of Sprint Broadband Direct customers.").
148 See generally Advanced Telecommunications Second Report, supra note 126, at IN 56-
59. Because DBS satellites are not equipped for two-way communications, upstream DirecPC
transmissions must use conventional telephone dial-up connection. Id. at 1 58. See also Di-
recPC Web Page, at http://www.direcpc.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2002). However, newer sys-
tems are now beginning to offer two-way high-speed Internet data transmission (and ISP) ser-
vices entirely via geostationary satellites, without the need for a dial-up uplink. See, e.g., Star-
Band Web Page, at http://www.starband.com/howitworks.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2002). IN-
TELSAT, in contrast, while serving as an important supplier of Intemet backbone to many ISPs,
does not function as an ISP, nor does it use its geostationary satellites to provide data transmis-
sion services directly to residential users. See INTELSAT Internet Services Web Page, at
http://www.intelsat.comlservices/services intemet.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
149 Teledesic Web Page, at http://www.teledesic.com/about/about.htm (last visited Sept. 5,
2002). See also SkyBridge Web Page, at http://www.skybridgesatellite.com/141-sys/index.htm
(last visited Sept. 5, 2002) (describing another proposed LEO system that, beginning in 2005,
promises to deliver two-way residential service with 5 Mbps downlink transmissions from a
constellation of 80 LEO satellites).
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briefly enjoyed de facto monopoly status in that market. Because
regulators never conceived of residential high-speed Internet ac-
cess as a "natural monopoly," however, cable modem service pro-
viders have not been shielded by laws against competition, nor
have they been subject to regulation of their rates or service offer-
ings or to mandatory unbundling requirements.
Today, only a minority of cable operators continue to enjoy
any de facto monopoly in the provision of residential high-speed
Internet access. The majority, in contrast, are now subject to in-
termodal competition, especially from DSL.15° In just two years,
these intermodal competitors have captured 32% of the still-
nascent market.' 51 Nevertheless, cable continues to enjoy a num-
ber of advantages over its intermodal competitors, including both
the cost savings that cable operators derive from the incumbency
of their existing "last mile" facilities, and the technological capac-
ity of HFC cable to offer substantially higher transmission speeds
than competing facilities.
IV. Two CONTROVERSIES OVER ACCESS
Because both local cable television systems and international
telecommunications satellites originally were conceived as "natu-
ral monopolies," the two media inspired pfarallel regulatory re-
sponses. Both types of facilities initially enjoyed legal protection
against intramodal competition, and both were protected by cir-
cumstances against effective intermodal competition. Both were
initially subject to substantial regulation of rates and service offer-
ings. Neither, however, was subject to access or unbundling re-
quirements. Eventually, in both cases, longstanding bans on in-
tramodal competition were lifted, while concurrent technological
advances enhanced the prospects for effective intermodal competi-
tion. These transitions to conditions of competition were accom-
panied in both cases by relaxation of previously applicable rate
and service regulation. Consistent with this transition, when cable
modem service was introduced by cable television system opera-
tors in the late 1990s, the new service was never subject to rate and
service regulation or to mandatory unbundling or competitive ac-
150 See Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 9 n.25 (noting that 57.5% of U.S. Zip Codes
are served by more than one facilities-based provider of residential high-speed Internet access;
20.3% are served by only one; and 22.2% are served by none).
'5 Id. at 9. Accord A NATION ONLINE, supra note 122, at 35. But see James B. Speta, A
Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 234 (2002)
(citations omitted) (asserting that cable modem service has enjoyed a "continued and expanding
lead . .. over its main high-speed competitor, DSL service, at least in residential markets.")
(emphasis added).
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cess requirements. To varying extents, the classical telecommuni-
cations paradigm of the "regulated monopoly" gave way to the
modem ideal of "market competition" in the local cable and inter-
national satellite sectors alike.
A mutual transition from monopoly to competition, however,
was not the only attribute shared by the local cable television and
international satellite telecommunications industries. Rather, the
two industries had something else in common: even as they were
generally being deregulated, both industries experienced parallel
controversies over customers' and competitors' demands for new
regulation that would mandate unbundling of services and facili-
ties. The first of these controversies concerned whether unaffili-
ated U.S. international common carriers should enjoy a legal right
to bypass INTELSAT's U.S. retail affiliate (COMSAT) and pur-
chase raw satellite transmission capacity directly from INTELSAT
on the same terms and conditions that such capacity could be pur-
chased by COMSAT. The second controversy concerned whether
unaffiliated ISPs should enjoy a legal right to bypass the retail
"cable ISP" affiliates of cable system operators and purchase raw
cable transmission capacity directly from the cable system opera-
tor on the same terms and conditions that such capacity could be
purchased by the affiliated cable ISP. The history of each of these
controversies is discussed in this Part.
A. The "INTELSAT Direct Access" Debate
Until 1985, non-INTELSAT satellites were forbidden from
providing international communications services to or from the
United States. 152  At the same time, INTELSAT's U.S. affiliate
COMSAT 153 enjoyed an exclusive right to provide INTELSAT sat-
152 See supra Part I.B; cf Separate Systems Order, supra note 103 (first authorizing satel-
lite systems separate from INTELSAT to provide international telecommunications service to
and from the United States).
153 The national governments that entered into the INTELSAT Agreement are referred to
as "Parties" to the INTELSAT treaty organization. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12,
at Art. I, 23 U.S.T. at 3813. The Agreement, however, did not require its member state govern-
ments to assume an active role in financing or operating the satellite system, but instead re-
quired each Party to "designate a telecommunications entity, public or private," to assume re-
sponsibility for financing its country's share of the satellite system and for performing certain
commercial operations. Id. at Art. 11(b). These designated telecommunications entities, which,
until privatization, collectively owned and operated the satellite facilities of the INTELSAT
system, were known as "Signatories" to the INTELSAT Operating Agreement, a separate com-
mercial agreement signed by the "Signatories" (and not by the State Parties) that established
procedures for governing INTELSAT's commercial operations. See INTELSAT Operating
Agreement, supra note 12, at 23 U.S.T. 4091. In the United States, COMSAT Corp., a publicly
traded District of Columbia corporation, was designated as the "U.S. Signatory" to INTELSAT.
1999 Direct Access Order, supra note 12, at 5. Each Signatory's investment share in INTEL-
SAT was required to remain in proportion to its share of the total use of INTELSAT satellite
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ellite transmission capacity to carriers and users located in the
United States.1 54 For these reasons, since at least the 1970s, sev-
eral U.S. international common carriers who were then COM-
SAT's principal customers sought to force INTELSAT to unbundle
its "raw" satellite "space segment" transmission capacity, and to
sell that space segment capacity to unaffiliated entities on the same
terms and conditions that it sold the capacity to COMSAT.'55 This
proposal for mandatory unbundling of transmission capacity from
telecommunications service was denoted "direct access to INTEL-
SAT."
, 156
transmission capacity. INTELSAT Agreement, supra, Art. V(b). Accordingly, in 1999, when
the FCC implemented direct access to INTELSAT, COMSAT's affiliation with INTELSAT was
manifested in its 20.4% investment share in INTELSAT, the largest of any Signatory. COM-
SAT Corp. 1999 SEC Form 10-K, at 6 (filed Mar. 30, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/22698/0000928385-00-001038-index.html.
"4 Under the FCC's "Authorized User 1" policy (in effect from 1966 to 1984), COMSAT
was deemed a "carrier's carrier," authorized to furnish INTELSAT capacity only to FCC-
designated common carriers, and forbidden from furnishing any INTELSAT services or capac-
ity directly to end users except in certain special circumstances. See Authorized User I, 4
F.C.C.2d 421 (1966). During the two decades that this policy was in effect, however, the FCC
recognized an ever-increasing number of such "special circumstances" in which COMSAT
could serve non-carrier end users directly. See, e.g., Spanish Int'l Network, 70 F.C.C.2d 2127
(1978) (authorizing COMSAT to provide international television program transmission service
directly to non-carrier users). Finally, in 1984, the FCC formally rescinded the Authorized User
I policy, and authorized COMSAT to bypass the international common carriers and begin pro-
viding end-to-end international communications services directly to certain "authorized" large
non-carrier end users (such as television broadcast networks). See Modification of Authorized
User Policy, 90 F.C.C.2d 1394 (1982) [hereinafter Authorized User 11], vacated and remanded,
ITr World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 725 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1984) and reinstated on
remand, 98 F.C.C.2d 158 (1984).
Confusingly, the FCC initially characterized its new Authorized User 11 policy as "au-
thoriz[ing] non-carrier users to gain direct access to Comsat's INTELSAT basic transmission
services." Id. at 1 69. (emphasis added). This policy, however, should not be confused with
"direct access to INTELSAT," which-unlike the Authorized User 11 policy--authorizes carriers
and non-carrier users to bypass COMSAT, and to obtain INTELSAT space segment capacity
directly from INTELSAT. See infra note 157. During the period from 1984 to 1999 during
which the Authorized User H policy was in effect but "direct access" was not, U.S. common
carriers could obtain the INTELSAT space segment capacity only from COMSAT, as part of a
bundled service offering.
155 See, e.g., In re Application of Communications Satellite Corp. for Authority to Provide
Satellite Television Services Directly to Users at United States Earth Stations, 76 F.C.C.2d 5,
6 (1980) (noting that several international common carriers had proposed to "be allowed direct
access to the INTELSAT operations center for the purpose of placing orders for television ser-
vice, or that carriers be allowed to acquire satellite facilities on an equal basis with Comsat
either on an indefeasible right of user basis or by directing that such facilities be provided on a
cost-pass-through basis."). As early as 1980, the Commission noted that "[t]he issue of direct
carrier access to Intelsat is not new .... The [carriers] frequently raise the issue of direct ac-
cess." Id. at 1 22-23.
156 See also 1999 Direct Access Order, supra note 12, at I ("'Direct access' refers to the
means by which users of the INTELSAT satellite system may obtain space segment capacity
directly from INTELSAT rather than having to go through an INTELSAT Signatory"). When
discussing "direct access to INTELSAT," commentators sometimes use the words "unbundling"
and "direct access" interchangeably. See, e.g., Robert M. Frieden, International Telecommuni-
cations and the Federal Communications Commission, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 423, 459
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Although earlier proposals for direct access had stalled, the is-
sue was revived in 1982 when the FCC authorized COMSAT, for
the first time, to bypass U.S. international common carriers (e.g.,
AT&T, ITT, Western Union), and to provide end-to-end interna-
tional communications services directly to "authorized" large non-
carrier end users (such as television broadcast networks).157 This
policy led several major U.S.-international common carriers to re-
new their call for "direct access" to INTELSAT. These carriers
argued that if COMSAT is permitted to bypass the U.S. carriers in
order to sell INTELSAT capacity directly to end users, then the
U.S. carriers should correspondingly be permitted to bypass
COMSAT and purchase raw satellite capacity directly from IN-
TELSAT on the same terms and conditions as COMSAT.158  To
address the carriers' concerns, the FCC initiated a new Notice of
Inquiry on "direct access. 159 In this Notice, the FCC noted that
the carriers (joined by the U.S. Justice Department and National
Telecommunications and Information Administration) had argued
that unbundled "direct access" to INTELSAT would serve the pub-
lic interest by:
0 enhancing price competition among international
telecommunications carriers by enabling those carri-
ers to compete effectively against COMSAT in the
(1983) (footnote omitted) (arguing that "[t]he Commission must ensure that carriers other than
Comsat can secure direct and cost-based access to INTELSAT space segment on the same terms
and conditions that Comsat secures. Toward that end, Comsat should be directed to unbundle
the INTELSAT space segment cost from associated earth station services and facilities ex-
penses.").
In fact, INTELSAT offers four different types, or "levels," of direct access to unaffiliated
carriers. 1999 Direct Access Order, supra note 12, at 8. This Article, like the FCC's direct
access orders and the ORBIT Act, uses the phrase "direct access" as a term of art to denote the
unbundling of INTELSAT space segment capacity that INTELSAT formally classifies as
"Level II Direct Access." See id. at W 2, 8 ("Level 3 direct access permits a customer to enter
into a contractual agreement with INTELSAT for the purpose of ordering, receiving, and paying
for INTELSAT space segment capacity at the same rates that INTELSAT charges its Signato-
ies."). For a description of the other types of INTELSAT direct access not at issue here, see
generally id. at 8 (summarizing ACCESSING INTELSAT ... DIRECTLY, reprinted in Record of
Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection
on H.R. 1872, 105
th Cong., at 135-141, and INTELSAT AP-21-E Report by the Board of Gov-
ernors on INTELSAT Access Arrangements, March 18, 1997). See also KENNEDY & PASTOR,
supra note 16, at 74-75 (same).
157 Authorized User 11, 90 F.C.C.2d 1394 (1982).
58 See id. at 1 100-105. The international common carriers use the satellite capacity to
carry international voice and data calls.
'59 See Regulatory Policies Concerning Direct Access to INTELSAT Space Segment for
the U.S. International Service Carriers, Notice of Inquiry, 90 F.C.C.2d 1446 (1982) [hereinafter
1982 Direct Access NOI], dismissed, 97 F.C.C.2d 296 (1984), dismissal affd, Western Union
Int'l, Inc. v FCC, 804 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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market for provision of INTELSAT space segment
capacity and transmission services to end users;
* lowering the price paid by international carriers to
acquire INTELSAT space segment capacity (causing
such savings to be passed through to consumers);
161
* guarding against COMSAT's using its monopoly
INTELSAT role to engage in unfair practices (such
as predatory underpricing of services offered directly
to the public) in competitive markets;
1 62
" permitting (and inspiring) additional carrier invest-
ment in INTELSAT satellite facilities, and thereby
enhancing deployment of such facilities; 163 and
" fostering innovation and efficiency in the provision
of international communications services. 64
As discussed in this Part, these arguments advanced in the
early 1980s in favor of carrier "direct access" to INTELSAT are
substantially similar to the arguments currently being advanced in
favor of ISP "open access" to HFC cable capacity used for high-
speed data transmission.
In 1984, the FCC terminated the 1982 "direct access" pro-
ceeding after concluding that "proponents of direct access have
failed to establish that it will serve the public interest.' 165 At that
time, the Commission was "unpersuaded that, whatever benefits
are to be derived, they would be so substantial as to outweigh the
adverse consequences which are likely to attend the adoption and
'60 Id. at i 1, 9. See also Regulatory Policies Concerning Direct Access to INTELSAT
Space Segment for the U.S. International Service Carriers, Report and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 296,
11, 56 (1984) ("1984 Direct Access Order"), affd Western Union Int'l, Inc. v FCC, 804 F.2d
1280 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
161 1982 Direct Access NOI, supra note 159, at 2.
162 Id. at ] 7, 12-13. See also 1984 Direct Access Order, supra note 160, at U 12, 56.
163 1982 Direct Access NOI, supra note 159, at 8. See also 1984 Direct Access Order,
supra note 160, at 14-15.
164 1982 Direct Access NO!, supra note 159, at 9.
165 1984 Direct Access Order, supra note 160, at 3. The Commission issued the 1984
Direct Access Order shortly after the D.C. Circuit court ordered it to conclude its still-open
1982 "direct access" proceeding. See ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 725 F.2d 732,
754-55 (D.C. Cir.1984) (affirming the FCC's Authorized User H Order, but directing the FCC to
give due consideration to the carriers' requests for "direct access" to INTELSAT).
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implementation of direct access."' 166 Specifically, the Commission
concluded, inter alia, that:
* Neither INTELSAT's underlying costs of operating
and maintaining the global satellite system nor the
corresponding wholesale IUC rates that it charged
would likely be affected by the implementation of
"direct access" in the United 
States. 6 o
* COMSAT's costs of administering INTELSAT pro-
grams and establishing INTELSAT circuit connectiv-
ities in the United States-which were not recovered
in INTELSAT's wholesale IUC rates-would not be
avoided by implementation of "direct access," and
would need to be recovered elsewhere. 1
68
* Because even COMSAT's new "end-to-end" service
would furnish only the communications link from a
U.S. earth station to an INTELSAT satellite-but
would not supply the terrestrial end-links between
the earth station and the end user's premises-
COMSAT did not enjoy any intramodal competitive
advantage over U.S. carriers.
169
166 1984 Direct Access Order, supra note 160, at 3. See also id. at 32 (concluding that
carrier direct access to INTELSAT "would not produce significant economic savings to carriers
or users").
167 Id. at V 40, 44. INTELSAT's "wholesale" charges for use of raw satellite transmission
capacity are termed "INTELSAT Utilization Charges" ("IUCs"). "The IUC serves as a meas-
ure, expressed on a per-circuit basis, of the costs INTELSAT incurs in constructing and operat-
ing the global satellite system." Id. at 1 34. "The level of the IUC is set so as to recover amorti-
zation of capital (depreciation expense), the operating expenses of the INTELSAT .system and
compensation to Signatories for the use of their capital." Id. The IUC does not reflect the local
"internal costs" of connecting a carrier or user to an INTELSAT satellite circuit. Id.
16' Id. at 44-47. Such costs include "COMSAT's return on its satellite investment; the
income tax Comsat is obligated to pay on that return; and Comsat's internal operations and
maintenance, research and development, and corporate headquarters expenses." Id. at 1 44.
With respect to such costs, the Commission concluded in 1984 that "were we to adopt direct
access, we would merely be changing the form in which these expenses would be recovered
and, in the process, adding an unnecessary layer of regulation with its attendant costs." Id. at
50.
169 Id. at 58. Specifically, the FCC concluded that although the U.S. common carriers
might be competitively disadvantaged in having to obtain the earth-station-to-satellite link from
COMSAT at "retail" price, the carriers possessed a compensating competitive advantage in
consequence of being able to furnish terrestrial ground-links to end users, which COMSAT
could not supply. Id. Stated differently, the Commission concluded that the carriers' ability to
offer retail "one-stop-shopping" to end users for a panoply of international satellite communica-
tions services provided effective competition to COMSAT's ability to obtain a single network
element of such service (the satellite link) at the "wholesale" IUC rate. See id. at U 58-62 (pro-
viding examples in which end users preferred to take seamless end-to-end service from a non-
COMSAT carrier).
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* Because transoceanic submarine cables were capable
of providing many of the same services as INTEL-
SAT, and at lower prices, COMSAT was always sub-
ject to intennodal competition.170
* Even assuming that direct access would produce sav-
ings for carriers, and that these savings would be
passed-through dollar-for-dollar by carriers to end-
users, such savings would be imperceptible to end-
users, because they would not constitute more than a
few percentage points of the total end-user charge.
171
Notably, because the FCC in 1984 found that direct access to
INTELSAT would not serve the public interest, the 1984 Direct
Access Order did not resolve whether the FCC possessed legal au-
thority to mandate "direct access" to INTELSAT.
172
The issue of "direct access to INTELSAT" next resurfaced in
the mid-1990s, when COMSAT petitioned the FCC for reclassifi-
cation as a non-dominant carrier. 173 By that time, as discussed in
Part II.B, supra, "several U.S. separate satellite systems provide[d]
170 Id. at 63-64. In 1984, the communications behemoth AT&T owned virtually all
transoceanic submarine cables to and from the United States, while also utilizing 90% of the
INTELSAT space segment capacity then leased to U.S. carriers. Id. at 1 64. Therefore, the
FCC noted, "the effect on intermodal competition of ... direct access ... would depend to a
significant degree on the behavior of AT&T." Id. While the Commission could not predict
exactly what AT&T (which opposed "direct access" to INTELSAT) would do, it did note that
under a "direct access" regime, "AT&T could in effect control investment decisions relating to
INTELSAT space segment, by and large removing that function from Comsat. Such a develop-
ment could be detrimental to the promotion of intermodal competition, insofar as AT&T could
bias investment and circuit utilization decisions in favor of one medium over the other." Id.
72 Id. at H 66-67. In 1984, COMSAT obtained raw space segment capacity from INTEL-
SAT at an INTELSAT Utilization Charge ("IUC") rate of $390 per circuit per month, and in-
curred a total cost (including expenses) of $800 per circuit per month to obtain such capacity.
Id. at V191 36, 38. COMSAT then leased these circuits to U.S. carriers and users at a rate of $1125
per circuit per month, a rate designed to recover both its cost of obtaining the INTELSAT space
segment capacity, and its additional cost of operating its proprietary earth station facilities,
which receive the INTELSAT signals. Id. After taking possession of the signals at the COM-
SAT earth station, the domestic carriers used their own terrestrial facilities to transmit the signal
to the premises of end-users located in the United States. Id. at 91 66. "The typical carrier
charge [to an end-user] for a voice-grade (telephone) end-to-end service is approximately
$4,000 per channel per month." Id. Using these figures, the FCC concluded that end-users
would receive only a minimal benefit even if the carriers could obtain raw INTELSAT space
segment capacity at a price closer to the IUC. Id. at 67.
172 See id. at 27-29 (summarizing arguments advanced by COMSAT that "direct access"
was prohibited by the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, but declining to address such
arguments). In affirming the 1984 Direct Access Order, the D.C. Circuit endorsed the FCC's
policy conclusions, and likewise declined to address whether the Commission would have had
legal authority to require "direct access" had it desired to do so. See Western Union Int'l, Inc. v.
FCC, 804 F.2d 1280, 1285-87 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
173 See COMSAT Non -Dominant Order, supra note 77.
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service to many foreign nations. 174 Moreover, the early 1990s
saw an unprecedented deployment of transoceanic submarine ca-
bles capable of providing many of the same services that INTEL-
SAT provided, and at lower cost to the user. 175  In response to
COMSAT's petition, several of COMSAT's customers and com-
petitors urged that COMSAT should be reclassified as non-
dominant only if direct access to INTELSAT were implemented in
the United States. 1
76
Without implementing direct access, the COMSAT Non-
Dominant Order granted COMSAT's request for reclassification
as a non-dominant carrier on every international route over which
INTELSAT was subject to facilities-based competition. 77 At the
same time, however, the Order urged COMSAT to voluntarily al-
low direct access to INTELSAT on the few remaining non-
competitive "thin routes" not served by any satellite or cable other
than INTELSAT. 178  According to the Order, permitting unaffili-
ated carriers and users to obtain "direct access" to INTELSAT on
the noncompetitive U.S. international routes would serve the pub-
lic interest by:
" reducing COMSAT's control in the U.S. over the
supply of INTELSAT satellite capacity serving non-
competitive markets, and thereby reducing COM-
SAT's market power in those markets;
* affording U.S. international carriers and users a
choice between using COMSAT or accessing IN-
'74 Id. at 11.
7 id.
17' Id. at 17 & n.49. The repeated efforts of COMSAT's customers and competitors to
raise the issue of direct access to INTELSAT in the context of FCC regulatory proceedings
initiated by COMSAT parallels the similar efforts of cable ISP customers and competitors to
raise the "cable open access" issue in the context of FCC (and local government) regulatory
proceedings (such as the proceedings seeking regulatory approval of the AT&T/TCI Cable
merger and the AOI/Time Warner merger) initiated by the cable companies. In both situations,
access proponents have argued that the regulatory result sought by the respective applicants
should be granted only if conditioned on the pertinent access requirement. See infra notes 208-
09, (discussing cable open access debates that arose in the FCC's proceedings on the
AT&T/TCI, AT&T/MediaOne, and AOL/Time Warner mergers).
177 Specifically, the COMSAT Non-Dominant Order reclassified COMSAT as a non-
dominant telecommunications communications carrier in the switched-voice, private-line, and
occasional-use video markets on every major route to or from the United States. COMSAT was
not, however, reclassified as non-dominant on the few remaining "thin routes" not served by
any other satellite system or submarine cable. On those routes (which accounted for about 7%
of COMSAT's INTELSAT revenues in 1999), COMSAT remained subject to dominant carrier
tariffing requirements and price-cap rate regulation. See Thin Route Order, supra note 115
(setting forth FCC regulatory policies for COMSAT's remaining "thin routes").178 See COMSATNon-Dominant Order, supra note 77, at 155-56.
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TELSAT directly to serve the non-competitive mar-
kets;
* spurring competition among telecommunications
service providers, and thereby promoting competitive
market conditions in markets that were then non-
competitive; and
* creating the potential for price competition, service
quality improvements and innovation. 1 7
9
The COMSAT Non-Dominant Order did not seek to identify
the public interest benefits that might accrue if direct access to
INTELSAT were implemented on the competitive routes that ac-
counted for 93% of COMSAT's INTELSAT revenues. Nonethe-
less, a new rulemaking proceeding was soon initiated to reconsider
implementing direct access to INTELSAT, without limitation to
noncompetitive routes.180  One year later, after decades of resisting
similar proposals, the Commission mandated direct access to IN-
TELSAT. 8' Then, on March 17, 2000, Congress enacted the
comprehensive ORBIT Act, which codified the 1999 Direct Access
Order by expressly providing for direct access to INTELSAT in
the United States. 182 Today, the FCC continues to play an active role
171 ld. at 1155.
18o In re Direct Access To The INTELSAT System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13
F.C.C.R. 22013 (1998). In explaining why it was reconsidering its earlier decision not to man-
date "direct access" in the United States, the FCC noted, inter alia, that direct access to INTEL-
SAT had not yet been implemented anywhere on earth in 1984, and that INTELSAT had then
had no procedures for implementing it. COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, supra note 77, at
U 156-57. In 1992, however, "INTELSAT introduced new procedures for gaining direct access
to INTELSAT satellites by non-Signatory carriers and users." 1999 Direct Access Order, supra
note 12, at 8. By 1998, when COMSAT was reclassified as non-dominant, direct access to
INTELSAT had been adopted in 76 foreign countries, including the United Kingdom. COM-
SATNon-Dominant Order, supra note 77, at 157.
'81 1999 Direct Access Order, supra note 12 (adopting policy of direct access to INTEL-
SAT).
182 See Open-Market Reorganization for the Betterment of International Telecommunica-
tions (ORBIT) Act, Pub. L. No. 106-180, § 641(a), 114 Stat. 48, 55 (2000), codified at 47
U.S.C.A. § 765(a) (Supp. 2001) (providing that "users or providers of telecommunications
services shall be permitted to obtain direct access to INTELSAT telecommunications services
and space segment capacity through purchases of such capacity or services from INTELSAT.").
Section 641(a) of ORBIT did nothing more than codify the FCC's 1999 Direct Access Order
(which had been issued six months earlier). However, both Congress and the FCC considered
enactment of the provision to be necessary because COMSAT's petition for review of the 1999
Direct Access Order, which was then pending before the D.C. Circuit, raised substantial ques-
tions about the Commission's legal authority under the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 to
implement direct access unilaterally. To resolve these questions, the "direct access" provision
was attached to the comprehensive ORBIT Act, whose principal provisions mandated a mecha-
nism for privatization of INTELSAT and Inmarsat.
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in the transition to "direct access" to INTELSAT. Indeed, as of summer
2002, the Commission was still considering a proposal to abrogate some
of INTELSAT's existing contractual capacity obligations in order to
free up more capacity for unaffiliated direct access users.
1 83
B. The Cable "Open Access" Debate
Before residential cable modem service was deployed in 1998,
most residential users had no means of obtaining Internet access
from their homes other than "via traditional 'dial-up' telephone
services provided by local exchange carriers (LECs) over copper
telephone lines. ' 184 In those days, most LECs enjoyed monopolies
over the provision of dial-tone service to their customers' homes.
Because LECs were required by law to unbundle dial-tone (trans-
portation) service from ISP service, however, the LECs' monopoly
over dial-tone service did not extend into the ISP market. 185
Rather, these unbundling requirements ensured that residential con-
sumers could choose to buy ISP service from an ISP affiliated with
their LEC or from a competing unaffiliated ISP. 186
The legal obligation of LECs to unbundle their transportation
services from their ISP services derived from several sources.
First, as regulated "public utility corporations," LECs had never
been permitted to deny telephone service to anyone willing to pay,
including potential competitors.1 87 Thus, LECs could not prevent
unaffiliated ISPs from obtaining telephone numbers. Similarly, as
regulated "public utility corporations," LECs could not require a
183 See INTELSAT Capacity Order, supra note 106, at 1 2, 5 (threatening to abrogate
existing supply contracts between COMSAT and INTELSAT if mandatory commercial negotia-
tions between COMSAT and unaffiliated direct access customers failed to satisfy direct access
customers' demands for INTELSAT satellite capacity); see also FCC Report to Congress as
Required by Orbit Act, 17 F.C.C.R. 11458, 11463-64 (2002) (noting that the FCC continues to
monitor COMSAT's commercial negotiations with unaffiliated direct access customers, and
also continues to consider taking further regulatory action to ensure satisfaction of direct access
customers' requirements for INTELSAT service or capacity).
1' Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access to the Internet, supra note 2, at 6.
185 See id. (discussing how customers use purchased telephone services to access ISPs and
such use of telephone service is independent of any choice of ISP). ISP service differs from
transportation service: "(in general, ISPs receive communications from their customers' com-
puters and route the communications to other computers connected either to their networks or
other networks." Id. at 9.
"6 See id.
187 See, e.g., North Carolina Pub. Serv. Co. v. Southern Power Co., 282 F. 837, 844 (4th
Cir. 1922) ("When a [public utility] corporation has definitely undertaken and entered upon a
particular service authorized by a charter... the obligation to perform the service is complete,
its rates and terms are subject to regulation by public authority, and it must serve all alike. In
such public service it cannot pick and choose its customers."). The traditional duties of tele-
communications common carriers to interconnect and to provide service to their competitors at
just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates is reflected in the Communications Act of 1934.
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203-205 (2000).
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consumer to purchase an unregulated service in order to obtain the
regulated service. 88  This longstanding regulatory doctrine fore-
closed the LECs from "bundling" an affiliated ISP service with
their standard local calling service, and requiring consumers to
take both or neither.
In addition, certain provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 that were designed to jumpstart competition in local calling
markets now require most LECs "to 'unbundle' and sell to their
competitors whatever new capabilities they add to their networks
at rates 'based on the cost[s] of providing' them."'' 89 Accordingly,
"[b]y virtue of the local competition provisions of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996, incumbent [LECs now] must grant un-
bundled access to competing carriers seeking to provide DSL ser-
vice."' 90 In addition, "[a] cluster of FCC rules that survived the
passage of the 1996 Act similarly entitles unaffiliated [ISPs] to
request interconnection and unbundled sale of network elements
from the largest ILECs for the purpose of providing DSL ser-
vice.' 1 9
1
Thus, both the legacy of public utility regulation and the local
competition provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
have brought "open access" (i.e. unbundling) regulatory require-
ments to all forms of Internet access delivered to residential users
by telephone wires, from "narrowband" to DSL.' 92 At the same
time, the separate legacy of cable television regulation (including
the modern trend towards cable television deregulation) has en-
abled cable modem service providers to avoid being subject to
similar requirements. 193  Unlike incumbent LECs offering dial-up
188 This result derived from longstanding regulatory doctrine that barred public utility
corporations from bundling regulated monopoly services with services also available from com-
petitors. See, e.g., Hicks v. City of Monroe Utilities Comm'n, 112 So.2d 635, 647 (La. 1959)
(A "public utility corporation" cannot refuse to render the service which it is authorized by its
charter to furnish because [of a customer's refusal to purchase a different service] ... Each kind
of service must be furnished on its own merits and no discrimination is permitted against a
customer for one service because he does not desire another service."); Seaton Mountain Elec.
Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Idaho Springs Inv. Co., 111 P. 834, 835-46 (Colo. 1910) (conclud-
ing that public utility corporation could not condition its provision of steam service on cus-
tomer's additional purchase of electric service).
189 PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 11.9.2, at 1070 (2d
ed. 1999) (emphasis added) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) and 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i)).
190 Chen, supra note 1, at 680 & n.18 (citing FCC Orders implementing 47 U.S.C.
§ 251(c)(3)).
'9' Id. at 680-81 & n.19 (citing FCC Orders and a treatise). See generally HUBER, supra
note 189, §§ 12.5.2-.3, at 1097-1103 (explaining the significance and ongoing vitality of the
"Expanded Interconnection" and "Open Network Architecture" rules); Speta, supra note 3, at
67-69 (detailing the legal obligation of ILECs to deal with competing DSL carriers).192 See Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 10, at N 6-7.
193 See generally Harold, supra note 8 (discussing how telephony's legacy of common
carrier interconnection and access requirements, and cable television's historical lack thereof,
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or high-speed DSL service, "cable operators currently are not le-
gally prohibited from having an exclusive relationship with one
particular ISP," including an affiliated or wholly-owned ISP. 194
Primarily because of these legacy-based regulatory distinctions,
cable modem service providers are now immune from unbundling
and access requirements that apply to DSL service providers, even
though the two services are fungible to the consumer.1 95
Because of the apparent arbitrariness of the distinction, many
unaffiliated ISPs and some public interest groups have advocated
that cable systems offering high-speed data transmission services
should be subject to "an 'open access' requirement similar to the
common carrier regime under Title II of the Communications
Act," which would require cable operators who offer high-speed
data transmission services "to grant unaffiliated ISPs non-
discriminatory access to their cable plant. 1 96  "These groups ar-
gued that broadband service over cable lines is essentially common
carriage, and moving bits between an ISP and a consumer is essen-
tially a transmission service.' 197 Cable open access proponents
have also asserted that an "open access" requirement would speed
deployment of high-speed Internet service to the residential market
and produce other competitive benefits; 198 protect the end-to-end
architecture of the Internet; t99 and/or that mandatory unbundling of
cable ISP services from cable transportation services is needed to
forestall future regulation of both of those services. 2°
have contributed to the divergence between the respective access requirements now applied to
DSL and cable modem service). See also Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 10, at 6
("Legacy regulations were based on technical and market assumptions concerning [cable and
telephone] networks and the services they delivered.").
194 Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access to the Internet, supra note 2, at 29. Like cable
television service, neither fixed wireless telecommunications services nor DBS television ser-
vice have a legacy of common carrier regulation. Accordingly, like cable but unlike DSL, resi-
dential ISP services using terrestrial or satellite wireless high-speed transmission technologies
are not subject to "open access' or "unbundling" requirements.
195 See Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 10, at 7 (recognizing that legacy regula-
tion has led to divergent regulatory requirements now being applied to cable modem and DSL
service despite the fact that these two platforms provide substantially the same service to the
consumer).
196 LATHEN, BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 132, at 36.
197 Id. See also Speta, supra note 3, at 78 (The "arguments for open access ... have a
strong pedigree in the history of telecommunications regulation, which has long been concerned
that dominant telephone companies will use their control over transport facilities to act anti-
competitively against computer companies or other information service providers.").
198 See infra Part ILI.A-ILI.B (discussing debates over whether access requirements spur
competition and deployment).
199 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 2, at 971 (stating that "[t]he presumption should be
against changes that would interfere with [the Internet's decentralized architecture.] The aim
should be to keep the footprint of monopoly power as small as it can be.").
200 See id. (asserting that "if we let natural monopoly services be bundled together with
potentially competitive services, we will end up having to regulate not only the monopoly ser-
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Similarly, most LECs also argue for regulatory parity between
cable and DSL.2 °1 Unlike the unaffiliated ISPs, however, the LECs
suggest that regulatory parity should be achieved not by imposing
"open access" on cable ISPs, but instead by eliminating the "open
access" and "unbundling" requirements that currently apply to
DSL.2°2
In response to "cable open access" proponents, some local
governments attempted to impose "open access" requirements
upon cable television franchisees in connection with transfers or
renewals of their franchises. °3 To date, however, the two U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeals that have reviewed such local ordi-
nances both have held the entire field to be preempted by federal
law.204 At the same time, however, both courts opined that federal
law vested the FCC with authority either to require "cable open
access" or to prohibit it, and that the FCC had not exercised this
authority one way or the other. 05 In so holding, these courts re-
vices but the competitive ones as well .... [Ironically], to allow cable companies to tie their
natural monopoly service to a competitive one ... will lead in the end to more regulation, and
what is worse, to unnecessary regulation.").
20' See, e.g., Comments of SBC Corp. and BellSouth Corpfiled in FCC GEN Docket No.
00-185, at i (filed Dec. 1, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/ecfs.html (asserting that
"like services must be treated alike, regardless of the name, corporate history, or traditional
lines-of-business of the service provider. Broadband Internet access is the same service,
whether it is provided over coax, over copper, or through the air.").
202 See, e.g., id. at iii ("Incumbent LECs should stand on equal footing with other [high-
speed transmission] service providers, ... [who] cannot be compelled to provide broadband on a
common carrier basis.... [T]he enormous regulatory scaffold that the Commission has built up
around incumbent LEC xDSL offerings must be dismantled."). In response to such suggestions,
the FCC is currently considering repealing the regulatory requirements that now require ILECs
to provide "DSL open access" to unaffiliated ISPs. See Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note
10, at 7. In addition, the ranking member of the Senate Commerce Committee (which over-
sees the FCC), recently introduced a bill that would "make certain that providers of broadband
services are treated in a similar fashion without regard to the particular mode of providing ser-
vice" by eliminating existing residential DSL unbundling and interconnection requirements.
148 CONG. REC. S7931 (Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. McCain). If enacted, Sen. McCain's
proposed "Consumer Broadband Deregulation Act" would add a new Section 702 to the Com-
munications Act that would require the FCC to eliminate residential DSL unbundling require-
ments within five years. See 148 CONG. REC. S7934 (Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. McCain)
(setting forth S. 2863, 107'h Congress, § 3, containing proposed new Communications Act
§ 702); see also 148 CONG. REC. S3572-73 (April 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Breaux) (intro-
ducing a competing bill, S. 2430, that would require the FCC to eliminate residential DSL un-
bundling requirements immediately).
203 See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access to the Internet, supra note 2, at 1 13 &
nn.25-29 (discussing several such attempts).
254 See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, Va., 257 F.3d 356, 359, 363-64 (4th
Cir. 2001) (holding that local "open access" laws are preempted by § 621(b)(3)(D) of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47
U.S.C. § 541(b)(3)(D)); AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877-79 (9th Cir. 2000)
(same).
2o5 See MediaOne, 257 F.3d at 365 (Although local governments are preempted from re-
quiring cable open access, "the merits of open access are not before us.... For the time being,
therefore, we are content to leave these issues to the expertise of the FCC."); AT&T, 216 F.3d at
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turned the "cable open access" debate squarely to the doorstep of
the FCC.2°
Despite (or perhaps because of) the intensity of the contro-
versy, the FCC thus far has assiduously avoided deciding whether
or not cable modem service providers should be required to un-
bundle high-speed data transmission services from ISP services, or
to provide transmission services to unaffiliated ISPs on nondis-
criminatory terms and conditions. Indeed, for years the FCC re-
fused even to rule on the threshold question whether the transmis-
sion component of cable modem service is properly characterized
as a "cable service," an "information service," a "telecommunica-
tions service," or some combination thereof.207  Even while this
threshold question remained unsettled, however, the Commission
was confronted with several ad hoc demands that it condition its
approval of the transfers of control of certain large individual ca-
ble systems on the transferee's acquiescence to "cable open ac-
cess" obligations.0 8 The results of these transfer proceedings were
inconsistent: "Itihe FCC rejected calls for open access in the
AT&T/TCI and AT&T/Media One merger decisions, but both the
FTC and the FCC imposed open access rules on the AOL/Time
Warner merger. ' 2°
879-80 ("Thus far, the FCC has not subjected cable broadband to any regulation, including
common carrier telecommunications regulation .... Congress has reposed the details of tele-
communications policy in the FCC, and we will not impinge on its authority over these mat-
ters.").
206 Cf. GTE.Net LLC v. Cox Communications, Inc., 185 F.Supp.2d 1141 (S.D. Cal. 2002)
(invoking doctrine of primary jurisdiction to defer decision to FCC on whether "cable open
access" is mandated by Communications Act).
"7 See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecom. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 352-56
& nn.4-6 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (surveying history of
FCC's refusal to classify the service that is provided by cable transmission of data between
customer's home and ISP's point-of-presence on the Internet) (citing FCC Orders, FCC amicus
briefs in circuit court cases, and FCC petition for certiorari in the case under review); see also
Harold, supra note 8, at 728 (noting the "court decisions spawned by the agency's deliberate
inaction" in refusing to adopt a classification).
208 See Speta, supra note 151, at 234 (discussing these transfer proceedings).
209 Id. See also In re AOL Time Warner Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16
F.C.C.R. 6547, R 17-18 (2001) [hereinafter AOL Time Warner] (requiring the merging parties,
inter alia, "to afford access to Time Warner's cable plant to unaffiliated ISPs ... and to hold
separate Road Runner, [Time Warner's affiliated] cable ISP, from AOL's ISP service until AOL
Time Warner offers an unaffiliated ISP on all AOL Time Warner cable systems"); accord
America Online, Inc. & Time Warner Inc., Decision & Order, No. C-3989, 2001 WL 410712, at
6-8 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Apr. 17, 2001) (prohibiting Time Warner cable systems from
"mak[ing] Available to any Subscriber any Affiliated Cable Broadband ISP Service until such
time as Non-affiliated Cable Broadband ISP Service ...is Available to Subscribers... "),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/aoltwdo.pdf. But cf. In re: Transfer of Control of
Licenses From Tele-Communications, Inc. to AT&T Corp., Memorandum and Order, 14
F.C.C.R. 3160, 96 (refusing to impose cable modem "open access" as a condition of approv-
ing the AT&T/TCI merger); In re Transfer of Control of Licenses From MediaOne Group, Inc.
to AT&T Corp., Memorandum and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 9816, H 126-28 (2000) [hereinafter
20021
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Finally, on March 15, 2002, the FCC classified the transmis-
sion component of cable modem service as an "information ser-
vice. 'z l In so doing, the FCC did not immediately implement ca-
ble open access, nor did it disclaim any authority or intention to do
so. Instead, by classifying every aspect of cable modem service as
an "information service" the FCC effectively protected its own
future discretion to adopt-or not to adopt-cable open access. 211
Had the Commission classified the transmission component of ca-
ble modem service as a "telecommunications service" rather than
an "information service," it might have been required to mandate
cable open access because telecommunications carriers are gener-
ally subject to common carrier regulation and unbundling require-
ments. 212  Conversely, classifying cable modem service as a "cable
MediaOne Transfer Order] (refusing to impose cable modem "open access" as a condition of
approving the AT&T/MediaOne merger), compliance deadlines suspended, 16 F.C.C.R. 5835
(2001) recon. denied, 16 F.C.C.R. 20587 (2001); but see id. at I 120-21 (noting that
AT&T/MediaOne had committed to voluntarily open its cable modem platform to unaffiliated
ISPs by June 2002, and to offer reasonably comparable access prices to unaffiliated ISPs).
210 Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 33. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
defines "information service" as "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing,
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommu-
nications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capabil-
ity for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the manage-
ment of a telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000). See also Cable Modem
Order, supra note 5, at 34 n. 139 (tracing etymology of the "information services" concept). In
1999, the FCC had already classified the "ISP" component of cable modem service as an "in-
formation service." See National Cable & Telecomms Ass'n, Inc., 534 U.S. at 352-53 n.4 (Tho-
mas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Deployment of Wireline Services Of-
fering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 15 F.C.C.R. 385, 401 (1999) (describing how
the Internet service is an "information service" rather than a telecommunication service), va-
cated in part in other respects, WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 246 F.3d 690 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and
otherwise aff'd, Ass'n of Communications Enterprises v. FCC, 253 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
The "ISP" component of cable modem service is the component in which data is transferred
from the provider's point-of-presence at the cable headend through a portal and onto the Inter-
net. See id.
211 Interestingly, some commentators in the cable modem rulemaking proceeding had
expressly proposed that "[t]he Commission's decision of how to classify cable modem service.
. . should be outcome-oriented: the Commission has substantial discretion in how to classify the
service and should thus consider the effect of its decision on competition in the broadband mar-
ketplace and the options it reserves for itself in the future." Comments of the Competition Pol-
icy Institute filed in In re Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over
Cable and Other Facilities, GEN Docket No. 00-185, at 1-2 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) available at
http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/. Although the classification of cable modem services as "information
services" did in fact maximize the Commission's reservation of power to exercise future discre-
tion, Chairman Powell specifically disclaimed that the classification was the product of result-
oriented decision-making. Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 4866-67 (Separate Statement of
Chairman Powell) ("The Commission is not permitted to look at the consequences of different
definitions and then choose the label that comports with its preferred regulatory treatment. That
would be contrary to law. The Commission must apply the definition and then accept the regula-
tory regime that adheres to that classification and that which Congress chose when it adopted
the statute.").
212 See Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access to the Internet, supra note 2, at 20 (noting
that the Communications Act "imposes a wide variety of obligations on telecommunications
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service" would likely have prohibited the FCC from implementing
cable open access, while simultaneously empowering local cable
franchising authorities to do so.
213
In contrast, the Communications Act neither requires nor
clearly prohibits the FCC from requiring unbundling of "informa-
tion services.' 214 Accordingly, in the same order in which it
adopted the classification, the FCC launched a new rulemaking
proceeding to consider the merits of "whether it is necessary or
appropriate at this time to require that cable operators provide un-
affiliated ISPs with the right to access cable modem service cus-
tomers directly....
V. CABLE OPEN ACCESS VS. DIRECT ACCESS TO INTELSAT IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The arguments for and against cable open access, discussed in
Part IV.B, above, center around three relatively uncontroversial
policy goals. "These include: (1) encouraging deployment of fa-
cilities that provide advanced services to the widest possible spec-
trum of Americans; (2) encouraging competition among providers
of broadband service; [and] (3) maintaining neutrality among the
technologies that provide broadband Internet services. 216 These
policy goals, stated abstractly, are not controversial, but the ques-
tion of whether cable open access will contribute to their achieve-
carriers, including requirements relating to interconnection, universal service contributions,
disabilities access, and privacy of subscriber information."). On the other hand, "the FCC has
broad authority to forbear from enforcing the telecommunications provisions if it determines
that such action is unnecessary to prevent discrimination and protect consumers, and is consis-
tent with the public interest." AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir.
2000) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)). Therefore, classifying the transmission component of cable
modem service as a "telecommunications service" would likely only have established a rebut-
table presumption in favor of cable open access.
213 See City of Portland, 216 F.3d at 876-78 (discussing the regulatory consequences of
classifying cable modem service as a "cable service").
214 Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at fll 75-79. See also infra Part V.C (discussing the
FCC's statutory authority to require unbundling of information services).
215 Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 72. In this new rulemaking proceeding, the
Commission continued to solicit reasons why the Commission might lack legal authority to
implement cable open access. See id. at 72, 79 (soliciting further comment on the scope of
the FCC's statutory authority to implement direct access); id. at U 80-82 (soliciting comment
on possible constitutional limitations on the FCC's authority to implement direct access). The
Commission also made clear, however, that it was now ready to consider the merits of imple-
menting such a policy. See id. at 73 (setting forth substantive considerations for comment).
216 Comments of the Competition Policy Institute, supra note 211, at 2 (responding to NOI
published at 15 F.C.C.R. 19287 (2000)). The Competition Policy Institute also notes a fourth
policy goal of "removing regulation where the public interest is served by that action." Id. A
general presumption favoring deregulation would, of course, weigh against regulatory imposi-
tion of either cable open access or INTELSAT direct access. However, because such a pre-
sumption would not appear to provide a basis for comparison between cable open access and
INTELSAT direct access, it is not discussed herein.
20021
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
217ment has generated substantial controversy. As discussed in
Part IV.A, above, the debate over open access to INTELSAT re-
volved around substantially the same policy issues, and generated
substantially similar controversies concerning the efficacy of ac-
cess regulation in advancing these goals. This Part compares the
efficacy of "cable open access" with the efficacy of "INTELSAT
direct access" in achieving each of these goals.
A. Encouraging Deployment of Facilities
Since 1934, it has been "the policy of the United States to en-
courage the provision of new technologies and services to the pub-
lic. '21  In 1996, Congress reaffirmed this policy when it directed
the FCC and state Public Utilities Commissions to:
[E]ncourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis
of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans
... by utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation, regula-
tory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the
local telecommunications market, or other regulating meth-
ods that remove barriers to infrastructure 
investment. w9
Accordingly, the Commission has recently characterized the
goal of "promot[ing] widespread and rapid deployment of high-
speed services" as one of its prime statutory objectives.22°
Encouraging the rapid deployment of new communications
facilities was also one of the principal goals of the Communica-
tions Act of 1962. Indeed, the Satellite Act expressly mandated
217 More than 300 public Comments and Reply Comments were filed in response to the
FCC's Notice of Inquiry concerning cable open access. See Inquiry Concerning High Speed
Access to the Internet, supra note 2.
21 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000).
219 Telecommunications Act of 1996 §706(a), Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 706(a), 110 Stat. 56,
153 (1996), codified in notes following 47 U.S.C. §157 (2000). The 1996 Act defines "ad-
vanced telecommunications capability" to mean all "high-speed, switched, broadband telecom-
munications capability that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data,
graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology." Id. § 706(c)(1). The FCC
implemented § 706 in Advanced Telecommunications Second Report, supra note 126.
220 Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access to the Internet, supra note 2, at 2. Accord id. at
12 (promising to "continue to monitor broadband deployment closely to see whether there are
developments that could affect our goal of encouraging deployment of broadband capabilities
pursuant to the requirements of section 706.") (quoting In re Inquiry Concerning the Advanced
Telecommunications NOI Capabilities to all Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion,
Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 101 (1999)).
221 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2000) ("it is the policy of the United States to establish, in
conjunction and in cooperation with other countries, as expeditiously as practicable a commer-
cial communications satellite system ...which will serve the communication needs of the
United States and other countries, and which will contribute to world peace and understand-
ing.") (emphasis added).
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that "[t]he new and expanded [satellite] telecommunication ser-
vices are to be made available as promptly as possible and are to
be extended to provide global coverage at the earliest practicable
date. 222
Proponents of "cable open access" have asserted that regula-
tory unbundling requirements would best serve Congress's goal of
encouraging rapid deployment of facilities. Specifically, propo-
nents warn that regardless of government policy, prohibitive entry
costs may indefinitely hinder new entrants from building "last-
mile" high-speed connections to residential users that are capable
of providing end-to-end facilities-based competition against in-
cumbent cable ISPs. 223 The cost to a potential new entrant of con-
structing Internet backbone and ISP facilities, however, may be
less prohibitive than the cost of constructing "last-mile" connec-
tions to the home.224 Accordingly, based on their prediction that
competition in the "last mile" will not come soon under any regu-
225latory regime, proponents have asserted that an open access pol-
icy would create incentives for competitors unequipped to deploy
new "last mile" facilities to, at least, deploy additional backbone
and ISP facilities that they would otherwise have no incentive to
deploy.22 6 Finally, proponents have also asserted that as these un-
222 Id. § 701(b) (emphasis added).
223 Cable open access proponents, for example, have asserted that "[s]ince cable currently
controls over 80% of the high-speed Internet access market, there is effectively no significant
competition in the broadband Internet access market." Comments of the OpenNet Coalition
filed in In re Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and
Other Facilities, GEN Docket No. 00-185, at ii (filed Dec. 1, 2000), available at
http://www.opennetcoalition.org/resources/index.html.
224 See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Does A Hierarchical Internet Necessitate Multilateral Interven-
tion?, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 361, 371 (2001) ("[Tlhe facilities-based, long-haul
telecommunications transmission marketplace has such substantial market entry and operational
costs that relatively few operators can efficiently and effectively enter and remain in the market.
This... contrasts with the comparatively low costs and low barriers to market entry in reselling
the long- haul services of a Tier-i [facilities-based] ISP.") (emphasis added and footnote omit-
ted).
225 See Comments of the OpenNet Coalition, supra note 223, at 4 (footnote omitted) ("As a
practical matter, only two methods of two-way high-speed Internet access . . . are presently
available for most Internet subscribers in the United States--cable Internet access and DSL.
DSL, however, has technical limitations which make it unavailable to many Americans.").
226 See id. at 2, 19-20 (asserting that a failure to implement cable open access "will leave
millions of high-speed cable Internet consumers with no choice but to accept and pay for ISPs
that are owned or affiliated with the cable operator," and will thereby "frustrate, delay, or sim-
ply deny" the rapid deployment of high-speed cable Internet services).
It should be noted that there is some controversy regarding whether deployment of addi-
tional non-last-mile ISP facilities does add value to the Internet. See Technological and Regula-
tory Factors Affecting Consumer Choice of Internet Providers, U. S. General Accounting Office
Report to the Sen. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Antitrust, Bus. Rights, and Competition,
GAO-01-93, at 30 (Oct. 2000) [hereinafter GAO Consumer Choice Study] (footnote omitted)
("The experts and industry officials we interviewed differed over whether a reduction in ISP
choice-if it occurs--constitutes a public policy concern. Some experts felt that.., a reduction
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affiliated backbone and ISP providers began to generate business
and revenues, they would eventually grow to the point where they
would find it feasible (and profitable) to build their own competi-
tive "last-mile" facilities.227
Similarly, "INTELSAT direct access" proponents also as-
serted that regulatory unbundling requirements would best encour-
age rapid deployment of facilities. Like construction of a citywide
cable system, construction and launch of a geostationary commu-
nications satellite can be prohibitively expensive: the cost of con-
structing and launching a single geostationary satellite normally
exceeds $500,000,000, 228 and a substantial proportion of satellite
launch attempts either explode on the launching pad or otherwise
fail to achieve orbit successfully. 229 The cost of constructing new
satellite earth stations, and new microwave and fiber optic links to
connect earth stations with end users, however, can be much lower
than the cost of constructing and launching a geostationary space
station. Accordifgly-and analogously with the deployment-
based arguments advanced by proponents of cable open access-
proponents asserted that INTELSAT direct access would expedite
the deployment of satellite earth stations and terrestrial microwave
and fiber optic link facilities, by making it possible for unaffiliated
carriers to compete against COMSAT for business delivering IN-
of consumer choice at the ISP layer is not a concern as long as there is adequate competition
among companies providing physical transport to the Internet"). For articulations of this view,
see, e.g., Frieden, supra note 224, at 369 (footnote omitted) ("In general, a healthy and effi-
ciently operating Internet industry can exist even under a hierarchical structure coupled with a
limited number of Tier-I ISPs.") (footnote omitted); accord Comments of Nat'l Cable Televi-
sion Ass'n filed in In re Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over
Cable and Other Facilities, GEN Docket No. 00-185, at 53 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) available at
http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/ (describing the effectiveness of competition to check the potential for
anticompetitive behavior by cable operators); Comments of Cox Communications filed in In re
Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facili-
ties, GEN Docket No. 00-185, at 31 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) available at http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/
(arguing that telecommunications services and information services are mutually exclusive).
For present purposes, however, this Article assumes that the FCC would conclude that addi-
tional deployment of non-last-mile ISP services will yield a marginal public benefit.
227 See, e.g., Comments of the OpenNet Coalition, supra note 223, at 19-20.
228 See, e.g., Andy Pasztor, Hughes, Lockheed Satellite Projects Lack Sponsors, WALL ST.
J., June 4, 2001, at A3 (projecting a cost between $4.4 billion and $5.2 billion for construction
and launch of eight to twelve proposed geostationary satellites).
229 See generally SELECT COMM., U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPORT ON U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY/COMMERCIAL CONCERNS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA, H.R. REP. NO. 105-851, chs. 5-8 (1999), available at
http://www.house.gov/coxreport/cont/gncont.html (discussing several satellite launch failures).
See also Dave Bross, Inevitable Launch Sector Shakeout Approaches, SATELLITE NEWS, Jan.
21, 2002, available at 2002 WL 8254885 (reporting that in 2001, only 3 failures resulted from
54 commercial satellite launch attempts globally, the best performance since 1989).
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TELSAT communications services to end users.230  Finally, direct
access proponents-again, like cable open access proponents-
also asserted that the revenues generated by unaffiliated carriers
operating under direct access would eventually make it possible
for those carriers to launch their own separate geostationary satel-
lite systems.
Opponents of both "cable open access" and "INTELSAT di-
rect access" have taken issue with the proponents' assumption that
end-to-end facilities-based competition would (or will) never ar-
rive. Although cable systems have been overbuilt by competing
cable systems in only a few localities, many cable ISPs have begun
to face intermodal facilities-based competition from competing
technologies such as DSL.2 31  Similarly, INTELSAT-despite its
history as a protected monopoly-has, in recent years, faced facili-
ties-based competition from both competing geostationary satellite
systems and from competing technologies (e.g., transoceanic sub-
marine cables) capable of providing similar international telecom-
munications transmission services. 232  Because end-to-end facili-
ties-based competition is economically feasible, opponents assert,
regulatory access requirements will actually retard deployment of
new facilities, by enabling putative competitors to obtain market
entry without making risky and expensive investments in compet-
ing end-to-end facilities.23 Moreover, opponents assert that access
230 See 1999 Direct Access Order, supra note 12, at 16 (citing carrier comments); see
also id. at 42 (concluding that while "direct access .. does not add another facilities-based
competitor, the additional choice, flexibility, and cost savings made available by direct access to
U.S. customers in use of an existing facilities-based provider-INTELSAT-would result in
increased competition."). Indeed, in the 1980s, some proponents asserted that direct access
would yield incentives for unaffiliated carriers to invest in INTELSAT itself, thereby enhancing
deployment of additional INTELSAT satellite facilities. 1982 Direct Access NOI, supra note
159, at 8. See also 1984 Direct Access Order, supra note 160, at 14-15. An analogue to
this argument in today's cable open access debate would be an assertion that cable open access
would encourage unaffiliated ISPs (e.g., EarthLink) to invest in facilities-based cable system
operators (e.g., AT&T/TCI or AOL Time Warner), and that such investment would enable the
cable operators to deploy additional last mile facilities. No such argument, however, appears to
have been advanced by any cable open access proponent to date.
231 See supra Part I.B.
232 See supra Part I.C.
233 See, e.g., Comments of AT&T filed in In re Notice of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed
Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GEN Docket No. 00-185, at 40-41 (filed
Dec. 1, 2000) ("By forbearing from imposing 'open access' regulations on cable operators, the
Commission has fostered an environment that encourages investment not only in cable, but also
in the alternative broadband technologies, wireless, satellite, and DSL") (quoting LATHEN,
BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 132, at 49); accord Comments of COMSAT Corp. filed in In
re Direct Access to the INTELSAT System, IB Docket No. 98-102, at 53 (filed Dec. 22, 1998)
(noting that a massive deployment of separate international satellite systems and transoceanic
submarine cables had "all occurred in the absence of direct access. And it is not at all clear how
substituting INTELSAT in the U.S. for COMSAT will engender more competition .. "); cf. id.
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requirements "inhibit the investment necessary to the continued
deployment of new technologies and rapid deployment of broad-
band capabilities ...[by] seriously undermin[ing] the ... incen-
tives to make such [investments]. 234  A leading opponent has
stated that under a "cable open access" regime:
There would be reduced reasons for cable operators to take
the substantial risks associated with the deployment of new
facilities and services if, from the first day, they were bur-
dened by onerous and burdensome government regulation
that forced them to make the broadband capabilities of their
cable plant available to competing Internet service providers
that have chosen not to take those risks .... The prospect of
ill-defined and far-reaching regulation would ...diminish
the ability of corporate entities to plan new buildouts, [and
also] would effectively kill the public equity market for fi-
nancing.235
The absolute merits of deployment-based arguments for both
"cable open access" and "INTELSAT direct access" are subject to
reasonable debate. In comparative perspective, however, the de-
ployment-based case for "cable open access" appears substantially
stronger than the deployment-based case for "INTELSAT direct
access." In 1999, when the FCC adopted a policy of direct access,
INTELSAT satellites were already subject to substantial facilities-
based competition on every major telecommunications route to or
from the United States. During that year, INTELSAT owned and
operated only 15 of the approximately 75 geosynchronous com-
mercial communications satellites that were then capable of serv-
ing the United States.236 Moreover, by 1999, transoceanic subma-
at 61 (asserting that direct access would distort the market and discourage deployment of com-
peting facilities by causing INTELSAT space segment capacity to be priced below-cost).
24 Comments of AT&T, supra note 233, at 68. Accord id. at 66 (asserting that a cable
open access requirement would "dramatically slow deployment of broadband access, deter
investment, stall development of new services and technologies, [and] discourage innovative
business models ... ").
235 Id. at 68-69 (citations omitted). Recently, President Bush may have tentatively en-
dorsed this view. See President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Economic Forum Plenary
Session (Aug. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2O02/08/20020813-5.html ("My administration is
promoting investment in broadband .... The Federal Communications Commission is focusing
on policies to encourage high-speed Internet service for every home and every business in
America. The private sector will deploy broadband. But government at all levels should re-
move hurdles that slow the pace of deployment.").
236 See PHILLIPS SATELLITE INDUSTRY DIRECTORY, supra note 105, at 17-234, 279-413
(setting forth complete information about each of these satellites and their operators). In 1999, a
total of nearly 200 geosynchronous commercial communications satellites were stationed in
orbit above the earth. Id. Of these 200 satellites, INTELSAT owned and operated 19. Id. Four
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rine fiber optic cables already provided about three times the
amount of U.S. international transmission circuits delivered by all
satellites-including INTELSAT-combined.237  Because of this
massive deployment of competitive facilities during the decade
before "direct access" to INTELSAT was mandated, INTELSAT's
share in the international telecommunications transmission market
dropped from nearly 100% in the mid-1980s, to less than half by
the late 1990s. 238 In 2001, when it privatized, INTELSAT was es-
timated to serve only 14% of the U.S. market for international sat-
ellite services,239 which was itself only one-third of the overall
market for international transmission services.24 °
Like INTELSAT, cable ISPs also face substantial facilities-
based competition from intermodal competitors. 241 But unlike IN-
TELSAT, cable ISPs have not yet surrendered the lion's share of
the their market share to their competitors, facilities-based or oth-
erwise. Rather, as of August 2001, cable modems continued to serve
68% of the market for residential high-speed Internet access242 and
"their upgraded networks are far more ubiquitous than any compet-
ing networks., 243  Moreover, although other high-speed transmis-
sion technologies (especially DSL) are currently gaining market
of INTELSAT's 19 satellites were incapable of serving the United States because they were
located above the Indian Ocean. Id.
237 See supra Part I.C; see also, e.g., COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, supra note 77, at
In9 11, 19, 32-39 (characterizing satellites and submarine cables as fungible commodities serving
the markets for switched voice, private line, and video services, and noting that cables compete
effectively against INTELSAT satellites on every major international telecommunications route
to or from the United States); id. at 19 (fewer than 19,000 satellite circuits carried U.S.-
international traffic, compared to more than 57,000 submarine cable circuits).
238 See id. at (fl 72-74, 92-93, 98-103 (INTELSAT's share of international switched voice
and private line traffic to and from the United States decreased from an average of 70% in 1988
to less than 21% in 1996; its share of the U.S. international video transmission market dropped
from 80% in 1994 to less than 45% in 1996).
239 Players Rieady For Further Consolidation, INTERSPACE, April 11, 2001, available at
2001 WL 10292682. At that time, INTELSAT's share in the U.S.-international satellite com-
munications market was third to its intramodal competitors Hughes/PanAmSat Corp. (36%) and
General Electric/GE Americom (now SES Americom) (29%). Id.
240 COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, supra note 77, at 19.
241 See supra Part I.B.; see also, e.g., MediaOne Transfer Order, supra note 209, at 91 116-
23 (declining to impose an open access condition because of, inter alia, the increasingly rapid
deployment of alternative high-speed Internet platforms, especially DSL).
242 Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 9. Accord A NATION ONLINE, supra note 122,
at 35; see also HIGH SPEED SERVICES STATUS REPORT, supra note 129, at 2 & table 3 (at year-
end 2001, 7.1 million homes and small businesses (65%) subscribed to cable modem service,
while 3.9 million (35%) subscribed to DSL service).
243 Comments of SBC Communications Inc. & BellSouth Corp. filed in In re Notice of
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GEN
Docket No. 00-185, at ii (filed Dec. 1, 2000). Accord id. at 5 & nn.12-13 (citing several market
share studies).
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share, the FCC has projected that cable will continue to lead the
broadband market until at least 2007.24
The theory that a government-mandated access requirement
will spur-rather than hinder-deployment of new facilities can
probably be correct only if some structural impediment (such as
conditions of "natural monopoly") is impairing the development of
end-to-end facilities-based competition.245 As discussed above,
both the residential high-speed Internet transmission market and
the international telecommunications transmission market seem to
be moving inexorably from conditions of de facto monopoly to
conditions of increasing competition. However, the international
telecommunications transmission market (which is now fully com-
petitive) has moved much further down this path than has the resi-
dential high-speed Internet transmission market (which cable mo-
dem service providers still dominate). Accordingly, the deploy-
ment-based justification for "cable open access" is comparatively
stronger than the deployment-based justification for "direct access
to INTELSAT."
B. Encouraging Competition Among Service Providers
Whether "cable open access" or "direct access to INTELSAT"
will enhance or diminish competition in their respective markets
are questions closely related to the issues, discussed in Part V.A,
supra, of whether such mandated access requirements will encour-
age or discourage rapid deployment of competitive facilities. In-
creased competition, of course, normally brings additional benefits
to consumers beyond merely encouraging investment in new facili-
ties. The benefits of competition that Congress has directed the
FCC to promote include enhanced consumer choice, lower con-
sumer prices, better quality of service, and innovative service of-
ferings. 246 The debate over whether government-mandated access
requirements will help achieve such benefits, however, parallels in
many respects the debate over whether such requirements will help
achieve the related goal of encouraging rapid deployment of new
telecommunications facilities.
2 See LATHEN, BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 132, at 27 & app. B, chart 2.
245 See supra notes 233-235 and accompanying text.
246 See, e.g., AOL Time Warner, supra note 209, at 59 n.169 ("[Iln adopting the 1996
Act, Congress established a clear national policy to 'promote the continued development of the
Internet' and 'to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet and other interactive computer services unfettered by Federal or State regulation."')
(quoting 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(l)-(2) (2000)); see also Comments of the OpenNet Coalition,
supra note 223, at 1-2 (specifically identifying the benefits of competition as including con-
sumer choice, lower prices, better quality of service, and innovative service offerings).
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Cable open access proponents, for example, have asserted that
since cable currently controls a dominant share of the residential
high-speed Internet access market, "there is effectively no signifi-
cant competition in [that] market." 247 These proponents assert that
cable open access would enhance consumer choice by "ensur[ing]
that the next generation of high speed Internet access develops
with the open architecture and accompanying vibrant competition
that has characterized the development of a competitive Internet to
date. 248 On this theory, a failure to implement cable open access
"will leave millions of high-speed cable Internet consumers with,
no choice but to accept and pay for ISPs that are owned or affili-
ated with the cable operator." 249 If so, access proponents assert,
then cable operators will have a means of forcing consumers to
pay for additional unwanted services in order to obtain the package
25
of high-speed Internet services they desire. 50 Proponents also as-
sert that cable-affiliated ISPs have incentives to restrict consum-
ers' access to Internet content-especially "streaming video"-that
threatens their core cable television business.25' Finally, propo-
nents assert that without cable open access, cable ISPs will extract
monopoly rents in the form of excessive rates charged to their resi-
dential customers.252
247 Comments of the OpenNet Coalition, supra note 223, at ii. See also GAO Consumer
Choice Study, supra note 226, at 44 ("[If broadband is a distinct market, cable firms do cur-
rently hold a leading position in that market.").
Comments of the OpenNet Coalition, supra note 223, at 19. See GAO Consumer
Choice Study, supra note 226, at 24 (noting that "the common carrier status of telephone com-
panies, which requires that they provide nondiscriminatory service at just and reasonable rates,
worked to give [narrowband] ISPs easy access to consumers through the telephone network").
249 Comments of the OpenNet Coalition, supra note 223, at 19-20.
250 Id. at 2; see also id. at 6 ("Because many ISPs have become 'content aggregators' offer-
ing varied content and diverse applications-in addition to basic 'on-ramp' capability, preserv-
ing choice in the ISP marketplace is key to allowing consumers to 'vote with their feet' and
switch ISPs if they do not like the content and/or applications of the ISP affiliated with their
cable modem service provider.") (quoting GAO Consumer Choice Study, supra note 226, at 30)
(citations omitted); cf Comments of the Competitive Access Coalition filed in In re Notice of
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GEN
Docket No. 00-185, at 5 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) (characterizing the now-routine bundling of cable
high-speed Internet transmission with affiliated cable ISP service as an "anticompetitive tying
agreement[]").
25 See Comments of the OpenNet Coalition, supra note 223, at 8 (alleging that a cable
ISP's recent decision to limit video streaming to ten minutes "likely resulted from a business
decision by cable operators to limit competition to the proprietary cable television service also
owned by the owners of cable modem service, thereby impeding the development of this impor-
tant new technology by limiting its markets.").
252 See, e.g., Comments of the Competitive Access Coalition, supra note 250, at 26-27
("Any company, in the legitimate pursuit of its self-interest, will seek to exploit its control over
a scarce resource.... It is natural for companies that control access to a connection point be-
tween producers and consumers to adopt strategies designed to maximize the profit potential of
that control.").
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Similarly, "INTELSAT direct access" proponents also as-
serted that regulatory unbundling requirements would:
[P]romote competition and result in: (1) greater customer
choice due to the availability of competitive alternatives for
accessing INTELSAT (where INTELSAT is their system of
choice); (2) opportunity for substantial cost savings as a re-
sult of competition for accessing INTELSAT, resulting in re-
duced end user prices; (3) greater customer control over ser-
vice provision (involving service quality, performance costs;
connectivity and redundancy); and (4) efficiencies in system
planning and set up of circuits.253
As with the deployment-based arguments discussed in Part
V.A, supra, however, the question of whether mandated access
requirements would yield the desired additional competitive bene-
fits turns on the question of whether access requirements will spur
or hinder competition. Seemingly, every identified benefit of
competition would be maximized by the development of genuine
facilities-based competition, as opposed to purely retail competi-
tion between resellers of transmission capacity provided using the
same underlying facilities.254 For this reason, mandatory unbun-
dling requirements are desirable only in communications markets
that enjoy no realistic near-term prospect for the development of
facilities-based competition, or, alternatively, in markets where
unbundling requirements would not reasonably be expected to cre-
ate a disincentive to such development. 5 Conversely, in markets
where facilities-based competition might be expected to develop,
unbundling requirements should not be adopted if they would cre-
ate a disincentive to such development. 6
The absolute merits of competition-based arguments for "ca-
ble open access" thus depend on one's predictions about contin-
23 See 1999 Direct Access Order, supra note 12, at 16 (citing Comments filed by direct
access proponents).
2' Under cable open access, unaffiliated ISPs would resell high-speed transmission capac-
ity provided by a single monopoly cable system operator. Under INTELSAT direct access,
retail international carriers would resell satellite space segment transmission capacity provided
by INTELSAT.
25 Cf Glen 0. Robinson, On Refusing To Deal With Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177,
1183-84 (2002) (under a pro-competitive interpretation of antitrust law, a dominant market
participant should be forced to deal with rivals only if it possesses a natural monopoly over an
"essential facility"); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1408 (1998) (regulated firms in possession
of natural monopoly bottlenecks generally have duties to interconnect, to offer unbundled net-
work service elements to competitors, and to sell services to competitors for resale to other
firms, including interconnecting firms and competitors).
256 See Robinson, supra note 255, at 1180 ("an obligation to deal with competitors is in-
consistent with a conception of competition as independent rivalry.").
[Vol. 53:77
CABLE OPENACCESS
gent future developments, and are therefore subject to reasonable
debate. In comparative perspective, however, the competition-
based case for "cable open access" appears substantially stronger
than the competition-based case for "INTELSAT direct access."
In 1999, when it implemented direct access to INTELSAT, the
FCC explained the competitive benefits of direct access as follows:
While ... direct access ... does not add another facilities-
based competitor, the additional choice, flexibility, and cost
savings made available by direct access to U.S. customers in
use of an existing facilities-based provider-INTELSAT-
would result in increased competition. . . . [D]irect access
would place competitive pressures on other satellite operators
in terms of service, price, and quality. In addition, it would
place competitive pressures on Comsat, particularly with re-
spect to services for which Comsat has a markup substan-
tially higher than INTELSAT IUC [wholesale] rates.257
Like direct access to INTELSAT, cable open access would not
add another facilities-based competitor. And like direct access to
INTELSAT, cable open access would make available to U.S.
customers the use of facilities that belong to an existing facilities-
based provider-the incumbent cable operator's "last mile" con-
nection-to obtain services from unaffiliated service providers
(here, ISPs) that compete against the facilities-based provider's
own affiliate. In the same way that direct access to INTELSAT
"would place competitive pressures on" the affiliate (COMSAT) of
the facilities-based provider (INTELSAT), cable open access
"would place competitive pressures on" the affiliate (cable ISP) of
the facilities-based provider (cable system operator). 8  In both
cases, these "competitive pressures: would be particularly acute
"with respect to services for which [the incumbent's retail affili-
ate] has a markup substantially higher than" its wholesale cost of
obtaining transmission capacity from its facilities-based affiliated
provider. 9
There are, however, several competitive differences between
direct access to INTELSAT and cable open access. First, while
many (perhaps most) customers use their ISP "only [as] a simple
'on-ramp' to the Internet," an increasing number of customers se-
lect their ISP based on the individual ISP's "content and applica-
tions," which may include proprietary "search engines," "content
257 1999 Direct Access Order, supra note 12, at 42.
258 Cf id.
259 id.
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aggregators," or a particular e-mail address domain.26° Indeed, the
most popular dial-up ISP, America Online, now offers a popular
"'bring-your-own-access' plan providing unlimited access to thou-
sands of unique AOL features ... for individuals who already have
an Internet connection or access through the work or school envi-
ronment. ,26  Because at least some customers are willing to pay
for AOL's content and applications even while obtaining their ba-
sic "'on-ramp' to the Internet" elsewhere, it would appear that
competition based on service offerings is possible between ISPs
who provide identical transmission services.
In the market for INTELSAT international space segment
transmission capacity, in contrast, such competition is unlikely.
INTELSAT space segment capacity is furnished in the form of
"raw" transmission capacity to international common carriers (e.g.,
AT&T, WorldCom, Sprint) and other users (e.g., television net-
works, ISPs). These carriers and users use this "raw" capacity to
provide end-to-end telecommunications services to their customers
or viewers. Regardless of whether "raw" INTELSAT capacity is
furnished by COMSAT, INTELSAT, or an unaffiliated "direct ac-
cess" provider, however, the transmission capacity itself is identi-
cal. While INTELSAT satellites are subject to vigorous facilities-
based competition based on price, availability, and quality of ser-
vice, competing "direct access" providers of "raw" INTELSAT
capacity seemingly have no meaningful way to compete with one
another by "innovating" in the nature of their service offerings.
Cable open access is also more likely than INTELSAT direct
access to result in meaningful price competition at the retail level.
Currently, there are substantial variations in price between compet-
ing narrowband "dial-up" ISPs, all of whom normally must rely on
the same local telephone company to transmit information between
their own points-of-presence and their subscribers' homes. A
number of advertiser-supported ISPs currently offer limited dial-up
Internet service cost-free to the user.262 Many no-frills ISPs offer
unlimited monthly 56K dial-up Internet service for $9.95 per
month or less. 263 On the other hand, AOL's "standard plan provid-
260 GAO Consumer Choice Study, supra note 226, at 30.
261 AOL Anywhere Pricing Plans, available at http://www.aol.com/info/pricing.html (last
visited Sept. 5, 2002).
262 See Freedomlist Cheap ISP Web Page, available at
http://www.freedomlist.com/find.php3?country=166&st=l (last visited Sept. 5, 2002) (listing 12
U.S.-based ISPs that offer dial-up Internet access free of charge to the user).
263 See Freedomlist Cheap ISP, available at
http://www.freedomlist.com/find.php3?countryl166&st=3 (last visited Sept. 5, 2002) (listing
124 U.S.-based ISPs that offer unlimited monthly 56K dial-up Internet access for less than $10
per month).
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ing access to AOL and the Internet" currently retails for $23.90 per
month.264 This significant variation in the price charged by ISPs
for traditional dial-up Internet access indicates that price competi-
tion between "pure" ISPs who do not provide "last-mile" facilities
is possible, and may exert downward pressure on ISP prices.
In contrast, the INTELSAT wholesale IUC rate constitutes
only a miniscule fraction of the retail cost of an international
phone call. Thus, direct access to INTELSAT holds far less poten-
tial than cable open access to provide cost savings to end users. In
1984, the FCC declined to adopt direct access when, inter alia, it
concluded that while "direct access might help trim the cost to
U.S. users of INTELSAT space segment, it is doubtful that any
savings in this area could exceed a few percentage points of the
total cost to U.S. users of a communications channel. 265
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, INTELSAT's wholesale IUC
rate continued to drop, as technological advances enabled each
new satellite to carry many more simultaneous calls than its prede-
cessor. By 1999, when the FCC implemented direct access, an
economic study conducted by the Harvard-affiliated Brattle Group
estimated that the INTELSAT IUC rate constituted only 1.3% of
the price of the average international phone call, meaning that any
consumer "savings [from direct access] would amount to only
1.3% of total end user charges, even if INTELSAT services were
provided free. 266 The same study also concluded that even this
potential 1.3% savings was highly likely to be appropriated by the
U.S. and foreign international carriers who initiated and terminated
the call, rather than passed through to the consumer.267
For these reasons, the competition-based justification for "ca-
ble open access" is comparatively stronger than the competition-
based justification for "direct access to INTELSAT."
264 AOL Anywhere Pricing Plans, supra note 261.
265 1984 Direct Access Order, supra note 160, at 49. See also id. at 67 ("We have not
been presented with any evidence to show that the alleged savings to be realized from these
[direct access] proposals, assuming, arguendo, that such are passed-through dollar-for-dollar by
carriers to end-users, would exceed more than a few percentage points of the total end-user
charge.").
266 Comments of COMSAT Corp. filed in Direct Access To The INTELSAT System, 113
Docket No. 98-192, at 73 n.200 (filed Dec. 23, 1998).
267 Id. at 74 & nn.201-02.
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C. Maintaining Regulatory Parity Among Technologies That Provide
the Same (or Fungible) Services
Historically, different types of communications facilities have
been subject to different FCC regulations.268 For much of the
twentieth century, the FCC's fragmented regulatory approach
made sense: cable television was not the same service as teleph-
ony, so why should it be subject to the same FCC regulations? 269
Indeed, even as technological advances began to facilitate inter-
modal competition in telecommunications, the FCC sometimes
continued to defend the propriety of certain legacy-based regula-
tory paradigms that effectively imposed wildly disparate obliga-
tions on head-to-head competitors.
By the mid-1990s, however, the FCC regularly asserted that
when competing technological platforms are capable of providing
fungible services, the public interest is normally best served by
regulatory neutrality. 271 As one commentator explained, "[c]alls
for fundamental equity and fairness of treatment are American
maxims; in regulatory circles, arguments for 'leveling the playing
field' exercise a great pull over time, particularly when the ser-
vices being regulated differently come to look more and more the
268 See supra Part II (discussing separate regulatory regimes that were employed to regu-
late cable, telephony, and satellite); see generally Harold, supra note 8 (discussing legacy of
platform-specific regulation).
269 Today, the FCC's Rules continue to be organized on a facility-specific basis. See, e.g.,
47 C.F.R. pt. 25 (2002) (setting forth rules governing communications satellites); 47 C.F.R. pt.
42-69 (2002) (setting forth rules governing wireline common carriers); FCC Radio Braodcast
Servicces, 47 C.F.R. pt. 73 (2002) (setting forth rules governing broadcast radio and television);
47 C.F.R. pt. 76 (2002) (setting forth rules governing cable TV).270 See, e.g., In re Transfer of Control of McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc. to AT&T,
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 10 F.C.C.R. 11786, 9 (1995) (footnotes
and citations omitted) (asserting that the 1934 Communications Act requires the FCC "to focus
on competition that benefits the public interest, not on equalizing competition among competi-
tors .... [Tihe Communications Act does not require parity between competitors as a general
principle."); see also MCI Telecommunications Corp., 68 F.C.C.2d 1553, 1564 & n.l (1978)
(Washburn, Comm'r, concurring) ("The touchstone of regulation should be rooted in the pub-
lic's interest, not in some notion of regulatory parity. This is especially true where the [regu-
lated] parties are ... dissimilarly situated.... It makes little sense to fashion the same cage for
a canary as for a gorilla."), affd sub nom., Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659 F. 2d 1092
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
271 See, e.g., In re Waiver of the Commission's Rules Regulating Rates for Cable Services,
Order Requesting Comments, II F.C.C.R. 1179, 25 (1995) (noting that the public interest
would be served by "establishing some measure of regulatory parity between the cable operators
and [video dial tone] programmers" who provide cable TV-like MVPD services over telephone
wires); In re Equal Access and Interconnection Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile
Radio Services, Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of Inquiry, 9 F.C.C.R. 5408, 3(1994) (suggesting that the public interest would be served by imposing the same "equal access
obligations" on wireless telecommunications licensees as those imposed on wireline licensees,
because, inter alia, imposition of such obligations would "foster regulatory parity between
wireline and wireless services."), proceeding terminated, 11 F.C.C.R. 12456 (1996).
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same to consumers. '272 Accordingly, Bush administration policy
now holds that:
[W]here possible, we should promote competition through a
technology-neutral paradigm.... [B]roadband services can
be deployed over telephony, cable, wireless and satellite plat-
forms. The differing histories and regulations surrounding
each type of platform makes absolute regulatory parity diffi-
cult to achieve, but it is important to try to regulate compara-
ble services in a manner that does not interfere with market-
place outcomes.273
Consistent with this policy, the FCC in the March 15, 2002
Cable Modem Order & NPRM expressed a desire "to create a ra-
tional framework for the regulation of competing services that are
provided via different technologies and network architectures. 274
Noting that "residential high-speed access to the Internet is evolv-
ing over multiple electronic platforms, including wireline, cable,
terrestrial wireless and satellite," the Commission stated that it
"strive[s] to develop an analytical approach that is, to the extent
possible, consistent across multiple platforms. 275
At present, of course, the FCC's regulations that govern the
residential market for high-speed Internet access are not consistent
across platforms. Rather, cable modem service is currently not
subject to any unbundling or open access requirements, while ca-
ble's chief rival, DSL, is subject to such requirements.276 Regula-
tory parity between cable and DSL, of course, could be attained
without implementing cable open access: the FCC could reach the
same goal by instead choosing to relax the unbundling require-
ments that currently apply to DSL service, as it has proposed to
272 Harold, supra note 8, at 728; cf 148 CONG. REc. S7932 (Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of
Sen. McCain) ("Broadband services can be provided over multiple platforms including tele-
phone, cable, wireless, satellite, and perhaps one day soon, power lines. Each of these platforms
is regulated differently based on the nature of the service the platform was originally designed to
provide. This legislation would move us closer to a harmonization of regulatory ancestry of a
particular platform.").
273 Ass't Sec'y of Commerce Nancy Victory, Keynote Address before the Alliance for
Public Technology Broadband Symposium, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/speeches/2002/apt_020802.htm; see also, e.g., FCC Comm'r
Michael K. Powell, Remarks before the Progress & Freedom Foundation (Dec. 8, 2000), avail-
able at http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/powell (calling for "rationaliz[ation]" of regulations
governing residential high-speed Internet access, on ground that "a bit is a bit," regardless of the
transmission system).
274 Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 6.
275 id.
276 See supra Part lII.
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do.277 However, implementation of cable open access certainly
remains one possible vehicle for the Commission to adopt a tech-
nology-neutral paradigm for regulating residential high-speed
Internet access that is consistent across multiple platforms.
278
The implementation of direct access to INTELSAT, in con-
trast, had precisely the opposite effect. Rather than introducing a
technology-neutral paradigm into the regulation of international
telecommunications services, direct access to INTELSAT replaced
the rough regulatory parity that had already developed in that mar-
ket with unique regulatory disparity. Even before direct access
was implemented, COMSAT already was prohibited from bundling
the provision of satellite transmission capacity (over which it his-
torically enjoyed market power) with its provision of ancillary ser-
vices that were subject to competition. 279  Thus, COMSAT, like
other dominant retail international common carriers, was long re-
quired to provide its services to its retail customers on an unbun-
dled "a la carte" basis. 280
At the same time, however, until 1999, neither INTELSAT
nor any other facilities-based satellite or submarine cable operator
had been required to sell raw international telecommunications
transmission capacity to an unaffiliated competitor on the same
wholesale terms and conditions that it sold such capacity to its
own retail affiliate.28' Thus, satellite operators such as
277 See Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 10 (initiating proceeding to consider
whether DSL unbundling requirements should be relaxed to attain regulatory parity with cable
modem service).
278 Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at W] 77-78 (suggesting that implementing cable open
access would advance the FCC's goal of regulatory parity, and querying whether there is any legal
or policy reason why cable modem service should not be subject to the same unbundling and
access requirements to which DSL service is subject).
279 See, e.g., COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, supra note 77, at 169-70 (indicating that
COMSAT must unbundle its earth station services from its provision of INTELSAT space seg-
ment transmission capacity); In re Communications Satellite Corp. Structural Relief Order, 8
F.C.C.R. 1531, 33 (1993) (indicating that COMSAT must unbundle its maritime value-added
services from its provision of ship-to-shore transmission capacity); In re COMSAT Corp. Peti-
tion for Further Partial Waiver of Structural Separation Requirements, Memorandum Order and
Opinion, 11 F.C.C.R. 7938, 29 (1996) (COMSAT must unbundle its provision of mobile
terminal equipment, related software, and other maritime value-added services from its provi-
sion of ship-to-shore transmission capacity).
280 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.10-63.17 (setting forth regulations that govern international com-
mon carriers). Cf Phil Weiser, Paradigm Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 U.
COLO. L. REV. 819, 827 (2000) ("From an antitrust perspective, mandates to unbundle facili-
ties-whether real or virtual-serve two purposes: first, to prevent the use of market power in
one market to disadvantage competition in a second market; and second, to facilitate competi-
tive entry into a market where a company's entrenched monopoly power would be extraordinar-
ily difficult to overcome.").
211 Until 1991, the FCC actually limited the quantity of international telecommunications
transmission capacity that a facilities-based provider could supply at wholesale rates to retail
resellers. See KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 16, at 107. In 1991, however, the FCC elimi-
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Hughes/PanAmSat never enjoyed any right to purchase transoce-
anic submarine cable transmission capacity at wholesale rates from
cable providers such as AT&T. Similarly, transoceanic submarine
cable operators such as AT&T have never had the right to purchase
satellite transmission capacity at wholesale rates from satellite op-
erators such as Hughes/PanAmSat.
Direct access to INTELSAT carves out a unique exception to
this general rule by imposing a unique regulatory burden on IN-
TELSAT that applies to none of INTELSAT's intermodal or in-
tramodal competitors. Under direct access, INTELSAT is required
to supply transmission capacity at wholesale rates to unaffiliated
satellite operators, submarine cable operators, or non-facilities-
based resellers.282 None of those competitors, however, are bur-
dened by any corresponding obligation to supply transmission ca-
pacity at wholesale rates to INTELSAT, to COMSAT, or to any-
one else.
As discussed above, one can reasonably debate whether im-
plementing cable open access would be the most efficacious way
for the FCC to advance its goal of a technology-neutral regulatory
parity. It is clear, however, that imposing unique direct access re-
quirements on INTELSAT that do not apply to any of its facilities-
based head-to-head competitors cannot be said to advance the
cause of regulatory parity. Accordingly, the parity-based case for
cable open access is comparatively stronger than the parity-based
case for "direct access to INTELSAT."
CONCLUSION
The FCC is now engaged in resolving whether cable system
operators who provide cable modem service to residential users
should be required to furnish cable transmission capacity to unaf-
filiated Internet Service Providers. To resolve this controversy, the
FCC has expressed a desire "to develop an analytical approach that
is, to the extent possible, consistent across multiple platforms. 283
This comment may have been intended to highlight the fact that DSL
service is currently subject to a panoply of access and unbundling
requirements that do not now apply to cable modem service.
However, it can also be read more broadly to suggest that in a
world of increasing technological convergence and increasing in-
termodal competition, a more universally consistent analytical ap-
nated such limitations after concluding that unlimited resale opportunities would lead to reduced
retail prices. Id. at 107-08 & n.12 (citing 70 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 160 (1991)).
282 See 1999 Direct Access Order, supra note 12.
283 Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at 9173.
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proach is needed to resolve the many analogous disputes over competi-
tive access to proprietary bottleneck facilities that continue to arise in a
broad range of communications contexts.
The issues raised by today's dispute over "cable open access"
are substantially analogous to those raised in past disputes over
"direct access" to the INTELSAT satellite system. Those disputes
were resolved in 1999, when the FCC authorized unaffiliated com-
petitors to obtain direct access to INTELSAT, on the grounds that
such a policy would: (1) encourage the widest possible deploy-
ment of communications facilities; (2) encourage competition
among providers of communications service; and (3) benefit con-
sumers by putting downward pressure on prices and upward pres-
sure on service quality and offerings. Proponents of cable open
access now make the same claims. Without exception, the cable
open access claims enjoy stronger factual support today than the
analogous claims enjoyed with respect to INTELSAT direct access
in 1999. Accordingly, implementation of cable open access today
would be analytically consistent with the implementation of direct
access to INTELSAT in 1999. Conversely, an FCC decision not to
implement cable open access would be analytically inconsistent
(indeed, irreconcilable) with its decision to impose INTELSAT
direct access in 1999.
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